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THE SECOND REVIVAL?
THE VISEGRÁD GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN 
MIGRANT CRISIS IN 2015-2017
The aim of this article is to present the Visegrád Group’s position towards the 
contemporary European migrant crisis. The author seeks to answer two main 
questions: what is the degree of coherence of the Group’s position and what are 
the internal factors of the V4’s stance towards the crisis? The article analyses the 
political situation in the Group’s member states, the V4’s stance towards the ear-
liest propositions concerning the migrant crisis, its fight against the implemen-
tation of the mandatory quotas, its stance towards the implementation of the 
EU’s decisions and internal factors of the V4’s policies. The author argues that 
although the members of the Group differ in their approach to many interna-
tional issues, their attitude towards the crisis is very similar. 
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2016, Visegrád Group (V4) celebrated the 25th anniversary of its forma-
tion. This informal collaboration between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia has had its ups and downs. In the first years after 1989, cooperation in the re-
gion was greeted with enthusiasm, which began to run out a decade later. In 2000, Pol-
ish Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the V4 is not in bloom, but is not eligible for 
liquidation either.1 After 2004, when all four states had become members of the North 
1 Bulletin of the Foreign Affairs Committee, no. 136, 3613/III, 19 December 2000, at <http://orka.
sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/0/8B8B96F2F69912ABC1256B73003D2173?OpenDocument>, 10 May 
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), the importance 
of cooperation started to be questioned, as the key objectives of the 1991 Visegrád Dec-
laration were reached.2 However, the Group has retained its potential as a platform for 
cooperation within the EU.3
After a few years of stagnation, around 2010 the group unexpectedly came to life, as 
one Polish scholar put it.4 This was supported by the increasingly active International 
Visegrád Fund, established in 2000 and contributing to the development of cultural 
and scientific cooperation between the states.5 Most importantly, however, the V4 be-
gan to gain recognition as a forum for cooperation in the field of internal and external 
security.6 The V4 was noticed because of its contribution to the development of the 
new European Security Strategy,7 to the building of the EU Battlegroups (for example 
the establishment of the Visegrád Battlegroup8) and the contribution to the Pooling 
& Sharing and NATO Smart Defence initiatives.9 In 2012 Polish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs talked about building a brand of the V4.10 The topic of the V4 became popular. 
However, the Group members significantly differ in their approach to many crucial is-
2017.
2 Biuro Spraw Międzynarodowych i Unii Europejskiej, Informacja na temat Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, War-
szawa 2012, p. 8.
3 See M. Dangerfield, “The Visegrád Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to 
Postaccession Cooperation”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 22, no. 3 (2008), pp. 661-663, at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325408315840>.
4 R. Kuźniar, Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 2012, p. 359.
5 See T. Nováková, M. Pavlík, J. Sýkora (eds.), Visegrád Fund = 15!, Bratislava 2015.
6 Long Term Vision of the Visegrád Countries on Deepening their Defence Cooperation (Visegrád, 14 III 
2014), The Visegrád Group, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2014-03-14-ltv>, 10 May 
2017. See also for example I.M. Szilágyi, “Problems and Future Possibilities of Visegrád Cooperation”, 
Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science, vol. 13, no. 2 (2014), 
pp. 299-300.
7 Kraje V4 pracują nad propozycją strategii bezpieczeństwa UE – spotkanie w Juracie, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa 
Narodowego, 27 May 2013, at <https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/4647,Kraje-V4-pracuja-nad-
propozycja-strategii-bezpieczenstwa-UE-spotkanie-wJuracie.html>, 10 May 2017.
8 Ł. Zalesiński, “Grupa Bojowa V4 coraz bliżej powstania”, Polska Zbrojna, 14 March 2014, at <http://
www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/11853?t=Grupa-Bojowa-V4-coraz-blizej-powstania>, 
10 May 2017. See T. Weiss, “Visegrád Battlegroup: A Flagship that Should Not Substitute for Real 
Defence Cooperation”, Visegrád Revue, 4 June 2012, at <http://visegrádrevue.eu/visegrád-battlegroup-
a-flagship-that-should-not-substitute-for-real-defence-cooperation>, 10 May 2017.
9 Joint Statement of the V4 ministers of defence, The Visegrád Group, 4 June 2013, at <http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements/joint-statement-of-the>, 1 March 2017; Long Term 
Vision of the Visegrád Countries…; Joint Communiqué of the Visegrád Group Ministers of Defence, 23 April, 
2015, Tomášov, The Visegrád Group, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/v4-defence- 
ministers>, 10 May 2017.
10 R. Sikorski, Grupa Wyszehradzka – budowanie marki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2012, at <http://
www.msz.gov.pl/resource/3fb3fce6-1a26-4473-a242-a2213e93adca:JCR>, 10 May 2017.
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sues such as energy security and relations with Russia.11 As for the current migration 
crisis, the literature suggests that the voice of the V4 is relatively consistent.12 The issue 
of migration even began to be perceived as the key binder of the Group.13 
The aim of this article is to present the V4’s position towards the contemporary Eu-
ropean migrant crisis and to test these statements. The author seeks to answer two ques-
tions: (i) what is the degree of coherence of the Group’s position? and (ii) what are the 
internal factors of the V4’s stance towards the migrant crisis? It is worth noting that this 
topic has not been thoroughly elaborated on so far14 even though the V4 is a popular 
subject of scientific inquiries.15 This article was created using a historical method. It 
covers the period from 2015, when the current European migrant crisis started,16 up to 
26 September 2017, when the EU’s relocation scheme ended.17 The final version of the 
article was submitted in October 2017, shortly before Czech legislative election. 
The most important part of the article’s literature is the official Group materials 
and documents of the EU institutions: the European Council, the European Parlia-
ment (the EP), the Council of the European Union (the Council), the European Com-
mission (the EC) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU). All the 
translations in this paper are the author’s unless otherwise indicated.
The article is divided into five parts. It analyses the political situation in the Group’s 
member states (part 1), the V4’s stance towards the earliest propositions concerning 
the migrant crisis (part 2), its fight against the implementation of the quotas (part 3), 
its stance towards the implementation of the two Council’s decisions, 1523 and 1601 
(part 4), and internal factors of the V4’s stance towards the migrant crisis (part 5).
11 P. Pieńkowski, “Europejskie społeczeństwo ryzyka wobec kryzysu na Ukrainie”, Władza Sądzenia, vol. 5 
(2015), p. 57.
12 A. Chojan, “Grupa Wyszehradzka w polityce zagranicznej Polski – między współpracą a rywalizacją”, 
Biuletyn Analiz i Opinii Zakładu Europeistyki, vol. 25, no. 4 (2016), p. 9.
13 In April 2016 Slovakian Institute for Public Affairs presented the results of a study on 25 years of the 
V4, as seen from the perspective of the public. One of the questions was: In your opinion, what are the 
most important areas of the Visegrád cooperation? Choose three that you find most important? Surveys were 
conducted between May and July 2015, when the migration crisis has not been widely commented on. 
The authors concluded: At the time of data collection (spring of 2015), the migration crisis has not been 
the top priority yet, but one can assume that this topic would have had the influence on the prioritisation 
of cooperation areas – O. Gyárfášová, G. Mesežnikov, 25 Years of the V4 as Seen by the Public, Bratislava 
2016, p. 13.
14 See one of the few articles elaborating on the issue: A. Potyrała, “Środkowoeuropejska koalicja niechęt-
nych wobec kryzysu migracyjnego 2015-2016”, Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne, vol. 1 (2016), at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2016.1.2>.
15 See B. Dančák et al. (eds.), Two Decades of Visegrád Cooperation. Selected V4 Bibliography, Bratislava 
2011.
16 An increasing flow of migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe has been visible 
since 2011-2012.
17 European Commission, Relocation – Sharing Responsibility, 27 September 2017, at <https://ec.europa.
eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170927_
factsheet_relocation_sharing_responsibility_en.pdf>, 25 November 2017.
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1. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE V4 COUNTRIES
In three out of the four V4 member states, there has been no change of government dur-
ing the period in question. In Hungary, the position of the Prime Minister has been oc-
cupied since 2010 by Viktor Orbán, the leader of Fidesz, which ruled alongside a small 
satellite party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).18 In 2012, János Áder 
representing Fidesz became the president of Hungary. In the Czech Republic, the co-
alition of three parties – the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), Czechoslovak 
People’s Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická, ČDD) and the ANO 2011 (the 
acronym stands for Akce nespokojených občanů – the Action of Dissatisfied Citi-
zens) – has been in power since 2014. The cabinet has been led by Bohuslav Sobotka 
(ČSSD). In the same year, Miloš Zeman, a former PM from ČSSD and at the time 
of the election representing the left-wing Left Party of Civic Rights (SPO), became 
president. Since 2012, the Slovak government has been led by Robert Fico from Direc-
tion – Social Democracy (Smer-sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD). It was the first one-
party cabinet of the independent Slovakia. In 2014, the presidential election was won 
by a non-party candidate Andrej Kiska. After the 2016 parliamentary election, Fico 
remained in power, but the creation of the government required the establishment of 
a coalition (see section 4.1).
Conversely, a change of power took place in Poland. The beginning of the Euro-
pean migrant crisis coincided with the double elections in Poland: presidential in May 
and parliamentary in October 2015. While the EU struggled with heated disagree-
ments concerning relocations of migrants, the eight-year rule of the coalition of Civic 
Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe, PSL) was coming to a close. In the years 2007–2014, the coalition was led by 
Donald Tusk (PO). Then, after he assumed the office of the President of the European 
Council on December 1st 2014, he was replaced by Ewa Kopacz (PO). Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), the main opposition party, was preparing to take power. 
The question of the scale of its victory remained open, as did the question as to whether 
it would succeed (along with two small ally parties) in gaining a majority of seats; still, 
the defeat of the PO-PSL coalition was considered to be a foregone conclusion. The 
May presidential election was won by Andrzej Duda (PiS), who defeated the incum-
bent Bronisław Komorowski (PO).
18 D. Kovarek, G. Soós, “Cut from the Same Cloth? A Comparative Analysis of Party Organizations in 
Hungary”, in K. Sobolewska-Myślik, B. Kosowska-Gąstoł, P. Borowiec (eds.), Organizational Struc tures 
of Political Parties in Central and Eastern Countries, Kraków 2016, p. 185.
51POLITEJA 5(50)/2017 The Second Revival?…
2.  THE VISEGRÁD GROUP’S STANCE ON THE FIRST PROPOSALS
CONCERNING THE MIGRANT CRISIS
2.1. The V4 and the European Agenda on Migration
Although since 2014 a significantly greater inflow of foreigners has been visible,19 it was 
in 2015 when the issue of migration to Europe has become prominent. As the num-
ber of migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea kept getting bigger, the 
word crisis became widely used. A few days after the Charlie Hebdo shooting of Janu-
ary 7th 2015, Orbán firmly stated that as long as he is PM, Hungary would not accept 
any migrants.20 Shortly thereafter, Fico and Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, stated that the multiculturalism project had failed and that Slovakia was re-
luctant to see the arrival of large numbers of Muslims, the rise of mosques and changes 
in the culture of the country.21 Meanwhile, the Czech government decided to accept 
15 Syrian families. At the same time, Milan Chovanec, Minister of Interior, insisted 
that the government was not interested in hosting large groups of migrants. President 
Zeman said that even though he supported humanitarian aid, it should be conducted 
in the affected countries. Resettlement is not a happy solution, even for the refugees them-
selves – he argued.22 In Poland, the discussion about migrants pertained rather to its 
eastern neighbours. At that time the media and the political elites did not pay much 
attention to the issue of the Mediterranean migration.
In February 2015, the V4 parliamentary foreign affairs committees issued a joint 
statement arguing that the efforts to deal with this humanitarian crisis have so far proven 
insufficient and inadequate. The governments were call to increase the support to sustain 
the needs of the refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as protect religious minorities, 
including Christians.23 Foreign ministers of the Visegrád, Nordic and Baltic States who 
met in March stated that the threat represented by ISIL/Daesh requires a systematic and 
comprehensive approach as well as long-term commitment covering various areas such as 
military means, fight against terrorism and radicalization, migration, stabilisation efforts 
as well as humanitarian assistance.24 
19 Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, Raport na temat obywateli Ukrainy, Warszawa, 26 February 2017, p. 8.
20 “Orbán villás nyelven beszél a bevándorlókról”, Népszava, 24 January 2015, at <http://nepszava.hu/
cikk/1046237-orban-villas-nyelven-beszel-a-bevandorlokrol>, 10 May 2017.
21 “Premiér Fico: Nemôžeme tolerovať príchod moslimov a stavanie mešít!”, Pluska.sk, 24 January 2015, 
at <http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/premier-fico-nemozeme-tolerovat-prichod-moslimov-
stavanie-mesit.html>, 10 May 2017.
22 V. Lang, “Česko přijme syrské uprchlíky. Vláda souhlasila jednomyslně”, Novinky.cz, 14 January 
2015, at <https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/358734-cesko-prijme-syrske-uprchliky-vlada-souhlasila-
jednomyslne.html>, 10 May 2017.
23 Conclusion from the Meeting of Foreign Affairs Committees of V4 Parliaments, Bratislava, February 25, 
2015, The Visegrád Group, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/conclusion-from-the>, 
10 May 2017.
24 Co-Chairs’ Statement Slovakia and Denmark. 3rd Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Visegrád, Nordic and 
Baltic States.March 12-13, 2015, High Tatras, The Visegrád Group, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/
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In spring 2015, information on the thousands of migrants entering Europe through 
the Mediterranean Sea and related tragedies became more apparent in the media.25 On 
March 4th, the EC started to work on a comprehensive European Agenda on Migration,26 
as declared by its president, Jean-Claude Juncker. As a candidate for this office, he had 
argued in 2014 that the EU’s new policy on the issue was needed.27 The issue of migra-
tion was said to be one of the political priorities of Juncker’s Commission.
In April, after a shipwreck claiming the lives of several hundred people, the prime 
ministers of Malta and Italy called for an extraordinary summit of the European Coun-
cil.28 On the next day, the EC presented a ten point action plan on migration prepared 
by Dimitris Avramopoulos, the European Commissioner for Migration, Home Af-
fairs and Citizenship, at a joint meeting of Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and Justice 
and Home Affairs Council ( JHA). The sixth point of the document stated that it was 
necessary to consider options for an emergency relocation mechanism, and the seventh 
mentioned an EU-wide voluntary pilot project on resettlement.29 A special meeting of 
the European Council that took place on April 23rd 2015 confirmed these proposals. 
The EU member states committed themselves to action in four priority areas for action: 
fighting traffickers, strengthening the EU’s presence at sea,30 preventing illegal migration 
flows, and reinforcing internal solidarity and responsibility. In the last area, the states de-
clared considering options for organising emergency relocation between all Member States 
on a voluntary basis and setting up the first voluntary pilot project on resettlement across 
calendar/2015/co-chairs-statement>, 10 May 2017.
25 See for example P. Sasnal (ed.), Niekontrolowane migracje do Unii Europejskiej – implikacje dla Polski, 
Warszawa 2015, pp. 11-13.
26 European Commission – Press release. Commission makes progress on a European Agenda on Migration, Eu-
ropean Union website, 4 March 2015, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4545_en.htm>, 
10 May 2017.
27 Juncker’s document stated: The recent terrible events in the Mediterranean have shown us that Europe 
needs to manage migration better, in all aspects. This is first of all a humanitarian imperative. I am con-
vinced that we must work closely together in a spirit of solidarity […]. On the basis of our shared values, we 
need to protect those in need through a strong common asylum policy. […] I also intend to explore the possi-
bility of using the European Asylum Support Office to assist third countries and Member States authorities 
in dealing with refugees and asylum requests in emergency situations, where appropriate on the ground in 
a third country that is particularly concerned – J.-C. Juncker, A New Start for Europe. My Agenda for Jobs, 
Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission.Ope-
ning Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg 2014, pp. 9-10. See also idem, 
My Five Point-Plan on Immigration, Jean-Claude Juncker’s website, 23 April 2014, at <http://juncker.
epp.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/nodes/en_02_immigration.pdf>, 10 May 20017.
28 “650 Dead in Migrant Shipwreck, Muscat and Renzi Demand EU Summit”, Malta Today, 19 April 
2015, at <http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/51977/boat_with_an_estimated_650_
migrants_on_board_capsizes#.WP9tWvnyhhE>, 10 May 2015.
29 European Commission – Press release. Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten point action plan on 
migration, European Union website, 20 April 2015, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
4813_en.htm>, 10 May 2017.
30 It meant tripling the resources available to Joint Operation Triton which began on November 1st 2014.
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the EU, offering places to persons qualifying for protection.31 The details were to be an-
nounced during the next meeting of the European Council, scheduled for May 13th.
2.2.  The European People’s Party and the European Parliament resolution 
of April 29th 2015
The discussions on a solidary effort to relieve Italy and Greece from the migratory pres-
sure had begun. Although some member states and, at the time, the European Coun-
cil advocated voluntary approach to the issue, the mechanism of top-down imposed 
binding quotas had its prominent supporters. Apart from the prime minister of Italy, 
the country greatly affected by the migration crisis, it was backed by Angela Merkel, 
the chancellor of Germany, a country which was a very popular migration destination. 
That was also the position of Juncker, who perceived the outcome of the April special 
meeting of the European Council as a failure. The member states disagreed with the 
proposal of an experiment in burden-sharing, based on distributing five to ten thousand 
migrants; they also did not agree with the proposals of Merkel and Juncker to make the 
distribution compulsory. Merkel’s proposal was aimed at adopting an algorithm of re-
location based on the country’s size and its relative wealth, as well as possibly factoring in 
unemployment rates and the size of ethnic minority communities.32 The idea was support-
ed by the European People’s Party (EPP), the party of Merkel, Juncker, Avramopoulos 
and Tusk. EPP’s Group Bureau favoured binding solidarity mechanism, i.e. a quota for 
the distribution of asylum seekers once a clear threshold is surpassed. It should take into ac-
count the size and population of a country, its economic situation and the number of per-
sons already enjoying protection in the Member State.33 
It should be noted that at the time most of the V4 ruling parties belonged to the 
EPP: Hungarian Fidesz, both parties ruling in Poland (PO and PSL) and one of the 
three ruling parties in the Czech Republic (KDU-ČSL). The V4 countries, however, 
were determined, consistently advocating voluntary participation in the emergency re-
location mechanism.34 Rafał Trzaskowski (PO), Polish Deputy Foreign Minister re-
31 Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015 – statement, European Council and the Co-
uncil of the European Union, 23 April 2015, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/04/23/special-euco-statement/>, 10 May 2017; Special meeting of the European Council, 
23/04/2015, European Council and the Council of the European Union, 23 April 2015, at <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/04/23>, 10 May 2017.
32 I. Traynor, “Germany Presses for Quota System for EU Migrant Distribution”, The Guardian, 29 April 
2015, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/germany-quota-system-eu-migrant-
distribution>, 10 May 2017.
33 “Asylum Seekers: EPP Group Calls for a Binding Quota for Distribution in EU Countries”, European 
People’s Party Group, 24 April 2015, at <http://www.eppgroup.eu/press-release/Asylum-Seekers%3A-
EPP-Group-calls-for-a-binding-quota>, 10 May 2015.
34 V. Votápek, “KOMENTÁŘ: Gesta nestačí. Česko se tváří, že se ho uprchlíci netýkají”, iDNES.cz, 
24 April 2015, at <http://zpravy.idnes.cz/cesko-by-se-nemelo-tvarit-ze-se-ho-uprchlici-netykaji-pcl-/
domaci.aspx?c=A150424_093405_domaci_san>, 10 May 2017; P. Novotný, “Fico v Bruseli: Cie-
ľom je zlikvidovať plavidlá ešte predtým, než sa na ne nalodia migranti”, Hospodárske noviny, 23 April 
2015, at <http://dennik.hnonline.sk/svet/529183-fico-v-bruseli-cielom-je-zlikvidovat-plavidla-
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sponsible for European affairs, stated that Warsaw is of the opinion that the division of 
responsibility must be on a voluntary basis. Poland was in favour of solidarity, but not of 
decreed solidarity. He went on explaining: It is difficult to imagine any quotas and im-
posing such obligations on member states, whether on poorer-richer or smaller-larger basis. 
This issue must be left to the member states.35
On April 29th, the EP adopted a resolution on the latest tragedies in the Mediterra-
nean and EU migration and asylum policies. Its content was a clear indication of the EP 
intentions. The authors of the document argued that a response to the latest tragedies in 
the Mediterranean was to be based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. It was 
highlighted that the need for the EU to step up fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity 
towards Member States which receive the highest numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in 
either absolute or proportional terms. At the same time, the EP expressed regret over the 
lack of commitment from the European Council to setting up a credible EU-wide binding 
mechanism for solidarity.36 Although 66.8% of the MEPs supported the resolution, it 
did not raise enthusiasm among the politicians representing the V4 states. 
It was viewed most enthusiastically by Slovaks – 10 out of 13 Slovakian MEPs (77%) 
supported it, including all four MEPs of the ruling SMER-SD. 10 out of 21 Czechs 
(48%) supported the resolution, including all three representatives of KDU-ČSL and 
all four representatives of ČSSD. All four MEPs of ANO 2011, the third coalition 
partner, voted against the resolution. Hungarian and Polish MEPs treated the resolu-
tion less favourably. Only 7 out of 21 Hungarian representatives voted for it (33%). 
MEPs of ruling Fidesz were divided: 9 abstained, one voted in favour, the other two 
were absent. The resolution found favour with only five out of 51 Polish MEPs (10%). 
Out of 23 MEPs of PO and PSL, who were members of EPP, 20 abstained, one voted 
for, one against, and one was absent. Only the MEPs of Great Britain were more reluc-
tant to the resolution then the Poles.37 
It is worth noting that the vote on the previous resolution devoted to this issue (res-
olution on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to 
migration), which took place on December 17th 2014, just before the onset of the crisis, 
did not arouse similar controversy, even though the document contained a call for the 
EU to step up fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity towards Member States which 
receive the highest numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in either absolute or proportion-
este-predtym-nez-sa-na-ne-nalodia-migranti>, 1 March 2017; “Orbán: Európának nincs szüksége 
bevándorlókra”, Népszabadság, 24 April 2015, at <http://nol.hu/kulfold/orban-europanak-nincs-
szuksege-bevandorlokra-1530027>, 10 May 2017.
35 Informacyjna Agencja Radiowa, Polska Agencja Prasowa, “Unia Europejska szuka rozwiązania proble-
mu imigrantów. Chce niszczyć łodzie i zwiększyć patrole”, PolskieRadio.pl, 22 April 2015, at <http://
www.polskieradio.pl/69/3/Artykul/1427091%2CUnia-Europejska-szuka-rozwiazania-problemu-
imigrantow-Chce-niszczyc-lodzie-i-zwiekszyc-patrole>, 10 May 2017.
36 European Parliament resolution of 29 April 2015 on the latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU 
migration and asylum policies, 2015/2660(RSP).
37 MEPVote, at <http://www.mepvote.eu>, 10 May 2017.
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al terms.38 The resolution was then supported by 92% MEPs, including almost all V4 
representatives: Slovaks (only one was not present, the rest voted for), Hungarians (one 
was not present, one did not vote), Czechs (two abstained, one voted against, one did 
not vote, one was not present) and Poles (5 MEPs representing far-right voted against, 
one did not vote, one was not present).39
2.3. The introduction of the European Agenda on Migration
In May 2015, it was certain that the EU would attempt to introduce a quota mechanism 
concerning both relocation of migrants staying in Italy and Greece and resettlement of 
migrants outside of the EU (mainly Syrians staying in neighbouring countries, such as 
Jordan and Lebanon). As expected, A European Agenda on Migration prepared by the 
EC introduced the obligatory distribution key. It was based on four criteria: 1) the size 
of the population (40%), 2) total GDP (40%), 3) the average number of spontaneous asy-
lum applications and the number of resettled refugees per 1 million inhabitants over the 
last years (10%), and 4) unemployment rate (10%). In 2016, the member states were 
to distribute among themselves 20,000 migrants in the resettlement procedure and an 
undetermined number in relocation.40
According to the EC, the V4 states would be responsible for 10.5% of that number 
in resettlement and 11.6% in relocation procedures. In both cases, most of the migrants 
would be received by Poland and Czech Republic. The EC was to present detailed solu-
tions by the end of May.41 On May 27th, the EC has adopted the first package of propos-
als following the Agenda. It upheld the number of 20,000 migrants in the resettlement 
procedure and established the number of 40,000 migrants in the relocation procedure 
(24,000 from Italy and 16,000 from Greece). The procedure would be conducted over 
two years.42 The division of migrants among the V4 states as proposed by the EC in 
May 2015 is shown in the table below.43
38 European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2014 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need 
for a holistic EU approach to migration, 2014/2907(RSP).
39 MEPVote, at <http://www.mepvote.eu>, 10 May 2017.
40 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “A European Agenda on 
Migration”, Brussels, 13 May 2015, COM(2015) 240 final, pp. 4-5.
41 Ibid., pp. 19-22.
42 European Commission – Press release. European Commission makes progress on Agenda on Migration, Eu-
ropean Union website, 27 May 2015, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5039_en.htm>, 
10 May 2017.
43 For detailed study on the distribution of migrants in years 2015-2016, see A. Adamczyk, “Kryzys imi-
gracyjny w UE i sposoby jego rozwiązania”, Przegląd Politologiczny, no. 3 (2016), at <http://dx.doi.
org/10.14746/pp.2016.21.3.3>.
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Table 1. The division of migrants among the V4 states as proposed by the EC on May 13th and 
May 27th 2015
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Poland 2659 6.6 962 4.8 3621 6
Czech 
Republic 1328 3.3 525 2.6 1853 3.1
Hungary 827 2.1 307 1.5 1134 1.9
Slovakia 785 2 319 1.6 1104 1.8
V4 5599 14 2113 10.5 7712 13
The author’s calculations are based on the following sources: European Commission, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions “A European Agenda on Migration”, Brussels, 13 May 2015, COM(2015) 240 
final, pp. 19-22; European Commission – Press release. European Commission makes progress on Agenda 
on Migration, European Union website, 27 May 2015, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
5039_en.htm>.
Although most of the EC propositions included in the Agenda and in the first im-
plementation package such as the action plan concerning migrant smuggling, the obli-
gation to take fingerprints, a public consultation on the future of the Blue Card Directive 
and the New Operational Plan for Operation Triton were supported by the V4 member 
states, the Group referred to the EC’s proposals negatively44 and held a common posi-
tion until September: yes to help migrants outside the EU, no to distribution key and 
imposing top-down quotas.45 The Group consequently demanded that refugees and eco-
44 “Orbán ismét nemzetállami hatáskörbe adná a halálbüntetés kérdését”, Híradó, 8 May 2015, at 
<http://www.hirado.hu/2015/05/08/interju-orban-viktor-miniszterelnokkel-a-kossuthon-eloben-
meghallgathatja-itt>, 10 May 2017.
45 A. Potyrała, S. Wojciechowski, “‘Za’ i ‘przeciw’. Unijny dwugłos w sprawie systemu relokacji”, Biuletyn 
Instytutu Zachodniego. Seria Specjalna: Uchodźcy w Europie, no. 197, 23 October 2015, pp. 2-4; E. Sta-
sik, “Strach zamiast solidarności. Polityka wobec uchodźców w Czechach i Słowacji”, Deutsche Welle, 
25 June 2015, at <http://www.dw.com/pl/strach-zamiast-solidarności-polityka-wobec-uchodźców-
w-czechach-i-słowacji/a-18540489>, 10 May 2017; Hungary Will Protect Its Own, and Thereby Eu-
rope’s External Borders from Illegal Migrants, Website of the Hungarian Government, 20 June 2015, at 
<http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/hungary-will-protect-its-own-and-thereby-
europe-s-external-borders-from-illegal-migrants>, 10 May 2017.
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nomic migrants would be distinguished and treated separately. Receiving the later was 
out of question.46 This stance of the V4 met with a cold reception from the EU leaders.
Particular indignation was caused by the construction of a fence on the Hungarian-
Serbian border, which meant shutting the main route for migrants heading for Western 
Europe, announced by the Orbán government on June 17th 2015.47 Apart from that, 
a new law was introduced, making illegal crossing of the border fence and damaging or 
hindering its construction criminal offences.48 Three months later, the construction of 
the wall on the Hungarian-Croatian border started as well.49 On June 23rd, Budapest 
ordered an indefinite suspension of the acceptance of illegal migrants from the other 
EU member states under the Dublin Regulation. The government’s spokesperson stat-
ed clearly: We are full.50 
In June, the prime ministers of the V4 countries held a summit with the president 
of France. The sides agreed that the problem of migration can only be addressed compre-
hensively through the adoption of both shortand long-term measures. The leaders of the 
five countries jointly stressed that although they welcomed the actions undertaken by 
the EU, they opposed the obligatory quotas. I do not think it is the right method, said 
François Hollande. They declared European solidarity and expressed high hopes for 
the forthcoming summit of the European Council scheduled for 25-26 June.51 Just be-
fore the summit, Fico pondered if a referendum would be needed to stop the quotas.52
During the summit, the other states, for example France, Spain, United Kingdom, 
and Lithuania, also expressed similar doubts about the obligatory quotas. Eventual-
ly, the voluntary basis was maintained despite the emotional opposition of Italy and 
Greece and Germany’s mediation attempts. By the end of July, the states were to con-
46 Political Refugees Have Always Been Accepted by Hungary, Website of the Hungarian Government, 
24 June 2015, at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/political-
refugees-have-always-been-accepted-by-hungary>, 10 May 2017. See also A. Juhász, B. Hunyadi, E. Zgut, 
Focus on Hungary: Refugees, Asylum and Migration, Prague 2015, p. 10.
47 D. Bita, “Négy méter magas vasfüggöny épül a déli határon”, Népszabadság, 17 June 2015, at <http://
nol.hu/belfold/negy-meter-magas-vasfuggony-epul-a-deli-hataron-1540587>, 10 May 2017.
48 N. Thorpe, “Migrant Crisis: Hungary Convicts First ‘Illegal Entrant’”, BBC News, 16 September 2015, 
at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34271304>, 10 May 2017.
49 Construction of Border Fence on Croatian Section Has Begun, Website of the Hungarian Government, 18 
September 2015, at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/construction-of-border-
fence-on-croatian-section-has-begun>, 10 May 2017.
50 Hungary is Full, Website of the Hungarian Government, 24 June 2015, at <http://www.kormany.hu/
en/prime-minister-s-office/news/hungary-is-full>, 10 May 2017.
51 Press Statement on the Occasion of the Summit of V4 Prime Ministers and the President of the French 
Republic, The Visegrád Group, 9 June 2015, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/press-
statement-on-the>, 10 May 2017; J. Lopatka, T. Jancarikova, “France, Central European States Oppose 
Quotas in EU Migrant Debate”, Reuters, 19 June 2015, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-
migrants-centraleurope-idUSKBN0OZ1IB20150619>, 10 May 2017.
52 S. Harkotová, “Fico chce k utečencom referendum. Aj keď vie odpoveď vopred”, Aktuálně.cz, 23 June 
2015, at <https://aktualne.atlas.sk/fico-pred-poslancami-ak-prejdu-povinne-kvoty-budeme-zvazovat 
-referendum/slovensko/politika/>, 10 May 2017.
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sensually decide on how to share the migrants.53 Kopacz said that Poland had reached 
its intended target.54 The Hungarian government spokesperson called the success of the 
Visegrád countries an achievement in itself.55 The June summit took place in a tense 
atmosphere; the media reported the opposition of the Italian Prime Minister loudly 
demanding the adoption of the mandatory quotas and the dispute between Tusk and 
Juncker. The former supported the V4 postulates, whereas the latter strongly advocated 
the mandatory mechanism.56 
3.  THE VISEGRÁD GROUP AND THE TWO EMERGENCY
RELOCATION SCHEMES
3.1.  The Visegrád Group’s proposals concerning reallocation and resettlement. The 
first relocation scheme
On July 20th 2015, JHA agreed by consensus on the distribution of 32,256 migrants 
within the relocation procedure. As for the remaining 7,744 people, the member states 
were to reach an understanding by the end of the year (however, they still did not). 
Poland and the Czech Republic declared that they would accept 1,100 migrants each, 
Slovakia – 100, and Hungary – none, being the only state, apart from Austria, which 
decided not to participate in the procedure. Within the resettlement procedure, the 
member states agreed to accept 22,504 migrants. Poland was to receive 900 people, the 
Czech Republic – 400, Slovakia – 100, Hungary – none, being the only state which 
had made that decision. The whole relocation process was planned for two years.57 The 
table below shows the V4 share of migrants.
53 European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions, Brussels, 26 June 2015, CO 
EUR 8, CONCL 3, p. 2; “Ilu imigrantów przyjmie Polska?”, Newsweek, 25 June 2015, at <http://
www.newsweek.pl/swiat/ilu-imigrantow-przyjma-panstwa-ue-polska-powinna-2600-osob-
,artykuly,365667,1.html>, 10 May 2017.
54 Premier Ewa Kopacz w Brukseli: pod koniec lipca Polska poinformuje, ilu przyjmie imigrantów, Pol ish Gov-
ernment, 26 June 2015, at <https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/aktualnosci/kwestia-nielegalnej-
imigracji-i-agenda-cyfrowa-wsrod-tematow-szczytu.html>, 10 May 2017.
55 Visegrád Countries’ Stance against Migrant Quotas Successful, Website of the Hungarian Government, 26 
June 2015, at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/Visegrád-countries-stance-
against-migrant-quotas-successful>, 10 May 2017.
56 “Přejímání uprchlíků v EU bude dobrovolné. Uspěli jsme, řekl Sobotka”, Lidové Noviny, 26 June 
2015, at <http://www.lidovky.cz/prejimani-uprchliku-v-eu-bude-dobrovolne-uspeli-jsme-rekl-sobotka-
1cl-/zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A150626_071705_ln_zahranici_mct>, 10 May 2017.
57 Council of the European Union, Outcome of the Council Meeting. 3405th Council meeting. Justice and 
Home Affairs, Brussels, 20 July 2015, 11097/15 (OR. en), Provisional Version, Presse 49 PR CO 41, 
pp. 3-8.
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Table 2. The first relocation and the resettlement of migrants among the V4 states  
as proposed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia on July 20th 2015
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Poland 1100 3.4 900 4 2000 3.6
Czech Republic 1100 3.4 400 1.8 1500 2.7
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 100 0.3 100 0.4 200 0.4
V4 2400 7.1 1400 6.2 3700 6.7
The author’s calculations are based on the following sources: Council of the European Union, Outcome of 
the Council Meeting. 3405th Council meeting. Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 20 July 2015, 11097/15 
(OR. en), Provisional Version, Presse 49 PR CO 41, pp. 4-5, 7-8.
For the time being, it was only a draft – the final decision was to be made at the 
next Council meeting. Warsaw announced its readiness to accept migrants.58 Out of the 
V4 countries, Poland was most open to do so, but still far from being enthusiastic. Al-
though initially reluctant, Poland finally gave in to Germany’s thinly veiled blackmail that 
Southern Europe will not be willing to maintain EU’s sanctions against Russia if Poland 
does not demonstrate solidarity with Italy and Greece. Warsaw also counted on the other 
member states to distribute all migrants among themselves, but that did not happen.59
In August 2015, the Slovak PM announced that Bratislava would only accept Syrian 
Christians, which caused great controversy. On the other hand, Slovakia agreed to tem-
porarily house 500 asylum seekers from Austria. They were supposed to return to Austria 
later on or be deported from the EU.60 Robert Kaliňák, Slovak minister of the interior 
and deputy PM, explained that Bratislava wanted to demonstrate solidarity and repay its 
58 See for example Przygotowania do przyjęcia 2 tys. uchodźców, Ministry of Interior and Administra-
tion, 30 July 2015, at <https://mswia.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/13569,Przygotowania-do-przyjecia-2-
tys-uchodzcow.html?search=28778>, 10 May 2017.
59 For more information on Poland’s negotiating positions, see J. Bielecki, “Niemcy uczą solidarności”, 
Rzeczpospolita, 21 July 2015, at <http://www.rp.pl/Uchodzcy/307209766-Niemcy-ucza-solidarnosci.
html?cid=44>.
60 “Foreign Media Are Reporting on Slovakia’s Stance towards Muslim Immigrants”, The Slovak Spectator, 
20 August 2015, at <https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20059674/foreign-media-are-reporting-on-slovakias-
stance-towards-muslim-immigrants.html>, 10 May 2015; J. Čokyna, I. Netík, “Hovorca, ktorý preslávil 
Slovensko: Bolo to vytrhnuté z kontextu”, Denník N, 20 August 2015, at <https://dennikn.sk/218528/
netik-rozhovor>, 10 May 2015; “Kaliňák podpísal vo Viedni memorandum o prijatí utečencov”, SME, 
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debts to Vienna, which had helped Slovakia before, for example in the case of the acces-
sion to the Schengen area.61 In a local referendum, the residents of Gabčíkovo, a small 
town near Hungarian and Austrian borders where migrants were to be relocated, almost 
unanimously opposed their reception. However, the referendum was non-binding.62 The 
Slovak authorities did not change their minds63 and migrants came to Gabčíkovo.64
However, it soon became clear that the number of 40,000 was insufficient and that 
the Commission and the countries concerned would strive to expand the relocation. 
On August 24th, Berlin suspended the Dublin Regulation for Syrian refugees, allowing 
migrants to apply for asylum even if Germany was not their first EU country of entry.65 
A week later, chancellor Merkel famously stated: we can do it!, stressing that Germa-
ny could handle arriving migrants. The same opinion was expressed earlier by Sigmar 
Gabriel, the vice-chancellor of Germany from Merkel’s CDU coalition partner, Social 
Democratic Party Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD).66 Then, 
on September 4th, Germany opened its borders to migrants staying in Hungary.67
21 July 2015, at <https://domov.sme.sk/c/7924000/kalinak-podpisal-vo-viedni-memorandum-o-
prijati-utecencov.html>, 10 May 2017.
61 “Fixiert: 500 Flüchtlinge kommen in die Slowakei”, Kurier, 21 July 2015, at <https://kurier.at/politik/
inland/fixiert-500-fluechtlinge-kommen-in-die-slowakei/142.627.774>, 10 May 2017.
62 See for example A. Nyzio, “Instrumenty demokracji bezpośredniej na przykładzie Republiki Słowac-
kiej i Republiki Czeskiej”, Nauki Polityczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Koła Nauk Politycznych UJ, no. 9 (2013), 
pp. 108-110.
63 M. Dugovič, “Gabčíkovo odmietlo utečencov, starosta bude písať ministrovi”, Denník N, 2 August 2015, 
at <https://dennikn.sk/203098/gabcikovo-hlasuje-proti-prijatiu-utecencov-skolu-strazia-sbs-kari>, 
10 May 2017.
64 “Syrian Refugees Complain about Gabčíkovo Camp”, The Slovak Spectator, 4 November 2015, at 
<https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20063030/syrian-refugees-complain-about-gabcikovo-camp.html>, 
10 May 2017.
65 M. Holehouse, J. Huggler, A. Vogt, “Germany Drops EU Rules to Allow in Syrian Refugees”, The 
Daily Telegraph, 24 August 2015, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
germany/11821822/Germany-drops-EU-rules-to-allow-in-Syrian-refugees.html>, 10 May 2017.
66 This most famous quote about the migration crisis is often presented without its context. Precisely what 
Merkel said was: Germany is a strong country. Our guiding motivation as we address these issues has to be: 
We achieved so much – we can do it! We can do it, and where we face an obstruction, we have to overcome 
it by working on it. […] Then there is a European dimension, and here I believe that we may say: Europe 
as a whole must move together. […] If Europe fails at the refugee problem, its tight connection to universal 
civil rights will break. It will be destroyed and that Europe will no longer be the one we imagine […], the 
one that we must continue to develop even today as our founding myth our founding myth (translation by 
Helga Druxes) – H. Druxes, P.A. Simpson, “Pegida as a European Far-Right Populist Movement”, Ger-
man Politics and Society, vol. 34, no. 4 (2016), p. 15, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2016.340401>; 
“Merkel: ‘Deutschland ist ein starkes Land’”, Stern, 31 August 2015, at <http://www.stern.de/politik/
deutschland/angela-merkel--deutschland-ist-ein-starkes-land-6427648.html>, 10 May 2017; “‘Wir 
schaffen das’ war eigentlich Gabriels Idee”, Die Welt, 1 September 2016, at <https://www.welt.de/
politik/deutschland/article157920725/Wir-schaffen-das-war-eigentlich-Gabriels-Idee.html>, 10 May 
2017.
67 K. Than, I. Preisinger, “Austria and Germany Open Borders to Migrants Offloaded by Hungary”, Reu-
ters, 5 September 2015, at at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary/austria-
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At the end of summer 2015, the government of Kopacz, being pressured by the EU 
and threatened with an increasingly raised issue of sanctions for evading obligations 
concerning the migrant crisis, was becoming more accustomed to the thought of ac-
cepting more migrants. The upcoming parliamentary election did not favour coming 
up with a comprehensive plan. The Polish foreign minister suggested that a revision 
of the Polish position was possible,68 but the principle of solidarity should apply to all 
of the EU policies. At the time, PiS, the main opposition party and the leader in the 
polls, presented a stance close to that of the ruling coalition of PO and PSL. The pos-
tulate of receiving 2,000 migrants did not cause a huge controversy among the Polish 
opposition. Just like the government and president Komorowski, PiS firmly advocated 
voluntary approach to the relocation and the separation of refugees and economic mi-
grants. One of the members of the government led by Kopacz told a reporter: Maybe 
in the same way we can agree that if the Minsk agreement is broken, then the Commission 
will decide that the Germans or the French send two brigades to Poland. They will prob-
ably not agree.69
Before the decision of July 20th could be adopted, the EP’s opinion was required. 
On September 9th, the resolution was supported by 72% of MEPs including only 25 out 
of 106 of V4’s representatives (though only nine of them represented ruling parties; six 
Poles from PO and three Slovaks from Smer-SD).70 Having obtained the EP’s approval, 
an extraordinary meeting of JHA held on September 14th decided by unanimous vote 
on establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit 
of Italy and of Greece.71 The JHA decision 1523 of September 14th did not raise huge 
controversies as it was reached by consensus and participation in the scheme was – at 
least technically speaking – voluntary.72 The same cannot be said about the second re-
location scheme, which shortly fallowed.
and-germany-open-borders-to-migrants-offloaded-by-hungary-idUSKCN0R40FO20150905>, 10 May 
2017.
68 Informacyjna Agencja Radiowa, Polska Agencja Prasowa, “Unijne sankcje wobec krajów, które nie przyj-
mą wystarczającej liczby imigrantów?”, PolskieRadio.pl, 31 August 2015, at <http://www.polskieradio.
pl/5/3/Artykul/1497419,Unijne-sankcje-wobec-krajow-ktore-nie-przyjma-wystarczajacej-liczby-
imigrantow>, 10 May 2017.
69 G. Osiecki, “PO i PIS jednym głosem w sprawie imigrantów. Decyzje dopiero po wyborach”, Dzien-
nik Gazeta Prawna, 1 September 2015, at <http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/891340,po-i-pis-
jednym-glosem-w-sprawie-imigrantow-decyzje-dopiero-po-wyborach.html>, 10 May 2017.
70 Provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, VoteWatch 
Europe, 9 September 2015, at <http://www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-provisional-measures-in-the-area-
of-international-protection-for-the-benefit-of-italy-and-greece-dra-17.html>, 10 May 2017.
71 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area 
of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, Official Journal of the European Union, 
L 239/146, 15 September 2015; Council of the European Union, Conclusions, Brussels, 14 September 
2015 (OR. en), 12002/1/15, REV 1, JAI 659, ASIM 86, FRONT 187, RELEX 711.
72 A. Potyrała, “W poszukiwaniu solidarności. Unia Europejska wobec kryzysu migracyjnego 2015”, Prze-
gląd Politologiczny, vol. 4 (2015), p. 46, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pp.2015.20.4.3>.
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3.2.  The widening of the relocation and the reintroduction of the EC’s binding 
quotas – the second relocation scheme
On September 9th, the EC presented the second implementation package following the 
European Agenda on Migration. It consisted of the following proposals: 1) An emergen-
cy relocation proposal for 120,000 refugees from Greece, Hungary and Italy; 2) A Perma-
nent Relocation Mechanism for all Member States; 3) A common European list of Safe 
Countries of Origin, 4) Making return policy more effective; 5) Communication on Pub-
lic Procurement rules for Refugee Support Measures; 6) Addressing the external dimension 
of the refugee crisis; and 7) A Trust Fund for Africa.73
The first proposal reintroduced the obligatory distribution key based on the indi-
cators included in the Agenda (see 1.4). To the quota of 40,000 migrants who were to 
be relocated from Italy and Greece as established in the first relocation scheme, the EC 
sought to add another 120,000 who were to be relocated from Italy (15,600), Greece 
(50,400) and Hungary (54,000). The relocation would be accompanied by €780 million 
EU budget support for participating Member States, including a 50% pre-financing rate 
to ensure that governments on national, regional and local level have the means to act very 
swiftly. Also a temporary solidarity clause, a gate which would make the process more 
elastic and reduce the resistance of reluctant states, was to be established. The docu-
ment stated that if, for justified and objective reasons such as a natural disaster, the EU’s 
member would not temporarily participate totally or in part in a relocation decision, it 
will have to make a financial contribution to the EU budget of an amount of 0.002% of its 
GDP. Then the EC would analyse the reasons notified by the country and take a decision 
on whether or not they justify the non-participation of a country in the scheme for a maxi-
mum of up to 12 months. In case of partial participation in the relocation, the amount will 
be reduced in proportion. The second proposal applied the same objective and verifiable 
distribution criteria as in 1); likewise it included a temporary solidarity clause.74
The V4 leaders met a few days before the EC’s new proposals were published and 
stressed the need for preserving the voluntary nature of EU solidarity measures. Also, 
they appealed: the EU must focus on a constructive dialogue leading to effective common 
action and avoid any mutual accusations.75 Yet in the next couple of days, Prime Minister 
Kopacz said that Poland would consider increasing its involvement. The reaction of the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia to the imposed quotas remained categorically negative. 
In the Czech Republic, the PM, the president and the leader of the largest opposition 
party, Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS), were speaking 
with one voice. This common position of the ruling social democrats and Christian 
73 European Commission – Press release. Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action, Europe-
an Union website, 9 September 2015, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm>, 
10 May 2017.
74 European Commission, Proposal for a Council decision establishing provisional measures in the area 
of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary, Brussels, 9 September 2015, 
COM(2015), 451 final, 2015/0209(NLE), p. 15; European Commission – Press release. Refugee Crisis…
75 Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the Visegrád Group Countries, Prague, 4 September 2015, 
The Visegrád Group, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/20150904-v4-joint>, 10 May 2017.
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democratic opposition was a rare case. The situation was similar in Slovakia where the 
ruling coalition and the main opposition parties found a common ground. President 
Kiska, however, had a different, more favourable view on accepting the migrants. The 
Czechs and Slovaks did not reject the EC proposals en bloc; for example, the Slovak for-
eign minister acknowledged the need for solidarity and assistance and strengthening of 
the return policy. He sought to address the causes of the crisis, i.e. to undertake actions 
in third countries. However, the mandatory quota system was unacceptable.76
Orbán, on the other hand, did not only reject the possibility of accepting imposed 
quotas, but also stressed that Hungary would not agree to the relocation of 54,000 mi-
grants from their soil. Before the publication of the EC’s document, when the proposal 
was referred to in Die Welt, a Hungarian PM called it a bluff.77 When it turned out to be 
official, he dismissed it altogether. An anonymous source claimed that the Hungarian 
government thought that the EC’s plan is only of superficial help. They argue that the re-
sult of the first relocation scheme in May only served as an invitation for more asylum seek-
ers to come, so they disagree with the whole scheme.78 The table below presents the quotas 
proposed by the EC in September.
76 M. Terenzani, “V4 United against Quotas”, The Slovak Spectator, 8 September 2015, at <https://
spectator.sme.sk/c/20060186/v4-united-against-quotas.html>, 10 May 2017; K. Lezova, “Why 
Slovakia Has Become the Focal Point for Opposition against EU Refugee Quotas”, Europp – Lon-
don School of Economics and Political Science Blogs, 8 October 2015, at <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
europpblog/2015/10/08/why-slovakia-has-become-the-focal-point-for-opposition-against-eu-refugee-
quotas/>, 10 May 2017; Informacyjna Agencja Radiowa, Polska Agencja Prasowa, “Podział uchodźców 
w UE. Jedna z największych grup trafi do Polski?”, PolskieRadio.pl, 9 September 2015, at < http:// 
www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1501949,Podzial-uchodzcow-w-UE-Jedna-z-najwiekszych-grup-
trafi-do-Polski>, 1 May 2017; M. Klang, “Sobotka: Kvóty nepodpoříme. Evropa se musí od plánů 
posunout k činům”, Aktuálně.cz, 9 September 2015, at <https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/politika/
sobotka-evropa-se-musi-od-planu-posunout-k-cinum/r~2bace45e56d911e5b6b20025900fea04/>, 
10 May 2017.
77 We Are Not Facing a Refugee Issue in Europe, Website of the Hungarian Government, 3 September 
2015, at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/we-are-not-facing-a-refugee-issue-
in-europe>, 10 May 2017.
78 E. Zalan, “Rejects EU Offer to Take Refugees”, EUobserver, 11 September 2015, at <https://euobserver.
com/migration/130217>, 10 May 2015.
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Table 3. The relocation of migrants among the V4 states as proposed by the EC on September 
9th 2015
Relocation –
EC’s September proposal (number)
Relocation –
EC’s September proposal (% out of 
120,000)
Poland 9287 7.7
Czech Republic 2978 2.5
Hungary 0 0
Slovakia 1502 1.2
V4 13767 11.5
The author’s calculations are based on the following source: European Commission – Press release. Refugee 
Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action, European Union website, 9 September 2015, at <http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm>.
On September 17th, the EC’s proposal was approved by the EP. Although the Coun-
cil decision gained support of the two thirds of the Parliament, it received little ap-
plause among the V4’s MEPs. Only 11 out of 106 representatives of the Group voted 
for (four Czechs, four Poles, and three Hungarians) and among them there were only 
four MEPs representing the ruling parties (three Poles from PO and one Czech from 
KDU-ČSL).79
3.3. The final decision on the second relocation scheme
The Commission’s proposals were the subject of a debate during the extraordinary JHA 
Council, which took place on September 22nd 2015. Unlike the first relocation, which 
was voluntary and consensual, the second one, mandatory and based on imposed quo-
tas, was a subject of controversy. Despite the objections of some member states, the 
proposals of the EC were accepted, and the JHA decision 1601 of September 22nd was 
adopted. The scheme would last till September 26th 2017. The ministers of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voted against the decision, and the Finn-
ish minister abstained. The vote split the Group, with Poland unexpectedly backing 
the decision on the second relocation scheme.80 Due to Budapest’s refusal to take part 
in the scheme, it was limited to migrants staying in Greece and Italy. Thus the num-
ber of migrants who were to be relocated was significantly smaller (see below). Unlike 
79 Council Decision Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection for the Benefit 
of Italy, Greece and Hungary, VoteWatch Europe, 17 September 2015, at <http://www.votewatch.eu/
en/term8-council-decision-establishing-provisional-measures-in-the-area-of-international-protection-
for-the-b-9.html>, 10 May 2017.
80 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area 
of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, Official Journal of the European Union, 
L 248/80, 24 September 2015.
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the previous proposal, the decision 1601 obligated the Hungarians to host more than 
thousand migrants from Greece and Italy. The Council’s decision did not mention the 
algorithm – in accordance with the V4 postulates, automatism was rejected and any 
subsequent emergency relocation would require member states’ decision. However, the 
fact that the resolution was adapted by a qualified majority vote made it look as im-
posed rather than the result of compromise. Minister Chovanec stated that the deci-
sion is a hasty move. In his opinion, major policy decisions such as this should be adopted 
by consensus.81 Later, Warsaw announced its satisfaction noting that its postulates such 
as the separate treatment of refugees and economic migrants, the protection of the EU’s 
external borders and the preservation of the freedom of distribution of migrants were 
agreed upon.82 The Polish deputy foreign minister Trzaskowski explained that the V4 
states had adopted different tactics. Due to the lack of a blocking minority and thus 
having no way of obstructing the decision, Poland decided that it was better to negoti-
ate its terms. On the other hand, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic sought to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the fact that the JHA decision took the solution 
to the migrant crisis out of the member states’ hands. Nonetheless, when it came to the 
merits of the issue, Trzaskowski ensured that the Group was in absolute agreement.83
It is true that the stance of Poland did not cause any substantial changes – the de-
cision 1601 would have been adopted despite the opposition from Warsaw.84 All the 
same, it held symbolic significance as for the first time the V4’s position on the funda-
mental issue of migration was not consistent. Minister Chovanec expressed his disap-
pointment and wondered if that meant that the V4 would become V3.85 Poles were 
criticised by president Zeman and Czech first deputy PM Andrej Babiš wondered if 
81 Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection 
for the Benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary – First Reading, Adoption of the Legislative Act, VoteWatch 
Europe, 22 September 2015, at <http://www.votewatch.eu/en/term8-proposal-for-a-council-decision-
establishing-provisional-measures-in-the-area-of-international-prote.html>, 10 May 2017.
82 Informacyjna Agencja Radiowa, Polska Agencja Prasowa, “UE przegłosowała decyzję o podziale 
imigrantów. Polska cofnęła swój sprzeciw”, PolskieRadio.pl, 22 September 2015, at <http://www.
polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1509225,UE-przeglosowala-decyzje-o-podziale-imigrantow-Polska-
cofnela-swoj-sprzeciw>, 10 May 2017.
83 M. Mikulska, “Trzaskowski: Grupa Wyszehradzka będzie współpracować”, Rzeczpospolita, 23 Septem-
ber 2015, at <http://www.rp.pl/Dyplomacja/309239751-Trzaskowski-Grupa-Wyszehradzka-bedzie-
wspolpracowac.html#ap-1>, 10 May 2017; “Rafał Trzaskowski: Polska przyjmie 4,5 tysiąca uchodź-
ców”, Interia.pl, 22 September 2015, at <http://fakty.interia.pl/raporty/raport-imigranci-z-afryki/
informacje/news-rafal-trzaskowski-polska-przyjmie-4-5-tysiaca-uchodzcow,nId,1890520>, 10 May 
2017.
84 Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection 
for the Benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary – First Reading, Adoption…
85 N. Nielsen, E. Zalan, “EU Forces ‘Voluntary’ Migrant Relocation on Eastern States”, EUobserver, 22 Au-
gust 2015, at <https://euobserver.com/migration/130374>, 10 May 2017. See also “EU pošle na Blíz-
ký východ miliardu eur, ‘polská zrada’ Visegrádu byla zapomenuta”, Lidové Noviny, 23 August 2015, at 
<http://www.lidovky.cz/polska-zrada-byla-zapomenuta-Visegrád-predvedl-pred-klicovym-summitem-
jednotu-gcu-/zpravy-svet.aspx?c=A150923_215448_ln_zahranici_ELE>, 10 May 2017.
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the Group still existed.86 The Group met the next day during an extraordinary informal 
meeting of the heads of state or government convened by Tusk. In the published joint 
statement, the V4 presented its priorities (among others strengthening of the EU’s ex-
ternal borders and adopting the list of safe countries of origin) while encouraging the 
EC to present a detailed and realistic implementation roadmap.87
Media all over the world commented on the remarks of the irritated Slovak PM. 
He called the outcome of JHA a dictate of the majority and stated: We have been refus-
ing this nonsense from the beginning, and as a sovereign country we have the right to sue.88 
Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia considered taking legal action, challenging the 
Council’s decision in the CJEU.89 The Czechs eventually withdrew but the Slovak law-
suit was filed on December 2nd 2015 (case C-643/15).90 The next day, the Hungarians 
joined in, challenging the decision (case C-647/15).91 The hearing took place on May 
10th 2017.92 Poland took part in it as an intervener in support of the applicants. A non-
binding opinion of the Advocate General, which was delivered on 26 July 2017, pro-
posed that the Court should dismiss both actions.93 Expectedly, on 6 September 2017 
the Grand Chamber of the CJEU agreed with that opinion, arguing that the Council 
could adopt the decision by a qualified majority.94 
The table below illustrates the number of migrants to be relocated to the V4 coun-
tries on the basis of the JHA’s decision of September 22nd.
86 “Česko závazky ohledně migrantů přijme, soudní spor by nikam nevedl”, Česká televize, 23 Septem-
ber 2015, at <http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/1589524-cesko-zavazky-ohledne-migrantu-
prijme-soudni-spor-nikam-nevedl>, 10 May 2017.
87 Joint Statement of the Visegrád Group countries on the current migration situation, Brussels, 23 Septem-
ber 2015, Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Bratislava, at <http://www.bratyslawa.msz.gov.pl/
resource/412d73ca-4f3c-4e58-9ac2-63f17f6815e1:JCR>, 10 May 2017.
88 R. Muller, J. Lopatka, “Slovakia Will Challenge EU Migrant Quotas in Court – PM”, Reuters, 23 Sep-
tember 2015, at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-slovakia-idUKKCN0RN13M2015 
0923>, 10 May 2017.
89 N. Nielsen, E. Zalan, “EU Forces…”; D. Ivanov, “Legislation on Emergency Relocation of Asylum-seekers 
in the EU”, European Parliament Think Tank, 14 October 2015, at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282015%29569018>, 10 May 2017.
90 Action brought on 2 December 2015 – Slovak Republic v Council of the European Union (Case C-643/15). 
See also “Slovakia Files Lawsuit against EU Quotas to Redistribute Migrants”, Reuters, 2 December 2015, 
at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-slovakia-idUSKBN0TL11K20151202>, 
10 May 2017.
91 Action brought on 3 December 2015 – Hungary v Council of the European Union (Case C-647/15).
92 InfoCuria – Case-law of the Court of Justice, at <http://curia.europa.eu>, 10 May 2017.
93 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 26 July 2017 (1). Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15. Slovak 
Republic, Hungary v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2017:618.
94 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber). 6 September 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631.
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Table 4. The second relocation among the V4 states as decided by the JHA  
on 22 September 2015 
Relocation –
JHA’s September decision (number)
Relocation –
JHA’s September decision  
(% out of total 65,999)
Poland 5082 7.7
Czech Republic 1591 2.4
Hungary 1294 2
Slovakia 802 1.2
V4 8769 13.3
The author’s calculations are based on the following sources: European Commission – Press release. European 
Commission makes progress on Agenda on Migration, European Union website, 27 May 2015, at <http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5039_en.htm>; Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 
2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 248/80, 24 September 2015, pp. 14-15.
In total, the JHA agreed on the relocation of 160,000 migrants; 40,000 within the 
first relocation scheme (the Council’s decision 1523 of September 14th) and additional 
120,000 within the second (the Council’s decision 1601 of September 22nd). However, 
at that point the states were willing to distribute among themselves only 60% of that 
number. 
As already mentioned, member states did not agree on 7,745 places within the first 
relocation scheme, and they remained unallocated. Within the second scheme only 
65,599 out of 120,000 migrants were to be relocated. The remaining 54,000 places, 
previously dedicated to relocation from Hungary, were to be divided at a later time, fol-
lowing the next decision of the Council. However, in September 2016, as a follow-up 
to the EU-Turkey deal on migrant crisis (which the V4 supported and wanted to use 
as a template of cooperation with third countries95), it was determined that those places 
will be used for resettlement from Turkey rather than relocation within the EU.96 The de-
95 A. Zachová et al., “Visegrád and Migration: Few Prospects for a Change in Position”, EurActiv, 16 Ja-
nuary 2017, at <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/Visegrád-and-migration-
few-prospects-for-a-change-in-position>, 10 May 2017; Joint Declaration of the Visegrád Group Prime 
Ministers, The Visegrád Group, 8 June 2016, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-
statements/joint-declaration-of-the-160609>, 10 May 2017.
96 European Commission – Fact Sheet. Questions and Answers: Commission calls for renewed efforts in im-
plementing solidarity measures under the European Agenda on Migration, European Union website, 
2 March 2017, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-349_en.htm>, 10 May 2017. 
See also European Commission – Press release. Commission makes immediate proposal to implement EU-
-Turkey agreement: 54,000 places allocated for resettlement of Syrians from Turkey, European Union
web site, 21 March 2016, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-981_en.htm>, 10 May 2017; 
European Commission – Fact Sheet. Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement – Questions and Answers, 
68 POLITEJA 5(50)/2017Arkadiusz Nyzio
cision to use those places for additional resettlements was adopted by the Council on 
29 September 2016.97 Thus, in total, 98,255 migrants were to be relocated: 32,256 ac-
cording to the decision 1523 and 65,999 according to the decision 1601.98 Therefore, 
the proposals concerning the relocation shown in tables 1 and 3 are not binding. Only 
the numbers on which the member states agreed upon in July (table 2) and September 
(table 4) 2015 are considered as such. As far as resettlement is concerned, the quotas of 
July 20th 2015 still apply (table 2). 
4.  THE VISEGRÁD GROUP’S STANCE TOWARDS
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COUNCIL’S DECISIONS
4.1. Parliamentary elections in Poland (2015) and Slovakia (2016)
The topic of the migration crisis played an important role in Polish and Slovakian cam-
paigns of 2015 and 2016. As widely predicted, the Polish parliamentary election of 
October 2015 was won by PiS and its satellites, the United Poland (Solidarna Polska, 
SP) and Poland Together – United Right (Polska Razem – Zjednoczona Prawica, PR). 
On November 6th, Beata Szydło from PiS became the new PM. As a candidate for this 
position, Szydło had called the decision of September 22nd a scandal which threatened 
the security of Poland. In her opinion, the government of Kopacz deceived the Visegrád 
countries. Furthermore, she acknowledged that the decision could serve as a precedent 
in subsequent years, which would allow the EU to impose additional numbers of mi-
grants on Poland and other countries.99 Despite these harsh words, Szydło’s govern-
ment initially decided to uphold its predecessors’ commitment to receive migrants. Ac-
cording to the prepared but finally abandoned regulation, in 2016 no more than 400 
people were to come to Poland.100 However, Szydło stressed that this applied strictly to 
refugees fleeing from war-torn countries and not economic migrants.101
European Union website, 28 September 2017, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
16-3204_en.htm>, 10 May 2017; Polska Agencja Prasowa, “KE: Projekt decyzji w sprawie przejęcia 
z Turcji 54 tys. Uchodźców”, Puls Biznesu, 21 March 2016, at <https://www.pb.pl/ke-projekt-decyzji-
w-sprawie-przejecia-z-turcji-54-tys-uchodzcow-825457>, 10 May 2017.
97 Council Decision (EU) 2016/1754 of 29 September 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establish-
ing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 268/82, 1 October 2016.
98 A. Adamczyk, “Kryzys imigracyjny w UE…”, p. 53.
99 Szydło: polski rząd oszukał kraje Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, YouTube, 23 September 2015, at <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=8QvILNO9ZOk&t=4s>, 10 May 2017.
100 Projekt rozporządzenia Rady Ministrów w sprawie relokacji cudzoziemców w roku 2016, 12 January 
2016.
101 See for example “Premier Beata Szydło dla Polsatu, Polsat News i Polsat News 2, cz. 1”, Polsat News, 
16 November 2015, at <http://www.polsatnews.pl/wideo/premier-beata-szydlo-dla-polsatu-polsat-
news-i-polsat-news-2-cz-1_6336884>, 10 May 2017. See also A. Walecka-Rynduch, “Lęk i niepokój 
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In February 2016, MPs of the ruling PiS presented a draft of a resolution on Poland’s 
immigration policy. Not only did it negatively evaluate the decisions of the JHA of Sep-
tember 22nd, but it also criticised the government of Kopacz for supporting it contrary 
to the other Visegrád countries and Romania.102 PO and PSL, opposition parties at the 
time, contested the draft but PiS had the majority. It was passed on April 1st.103 It was 
expected that the PiS victory in the elections of 2015 would contribute to tightening of 
Poland’s cooperation within V4.104 That was also the position of president Duda. During 
the debate with the incumbent president Komorowski supported by PO, he stated: We 
should return to work within the Visegrád Group, which needs to be renewed. I think that 
Poland could take the initiative here.105 Poland’s support of the complaints brought to 
CJEU by Slovakia and Hungary sent an important political signal.106
As it has already been mentioned, Smer-SD won the election once again in March 
2016 and Fico remained prime minister, this time leading the coalition government. 
The campaign slogan of Smer-SD, We Protect Slovakia (Chráňme Slovensko), obvious-
ly referred to the migration crisis and the adamant position of the Slovakian govern-
ment.107 The PM explained that the migrants pose a threat to his country and clearly 
stated in January 2016: Not only are we refusing mandatory quotas, we will never make 
a voluntary decision that would lead to formation of a unified Muslim community in Slo-
vakia.108 Furthermore, the decision on challenging the relocation mechanism should 
be read in the context of the pre-election campaign. It is also worth pointing out that 
People’s Party – Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS), a far-right, 
jako elementy politycznych strategii komunikacyjnych. Analiza kampanii prezydenckiej i parlamen-
tarnej 2015 roku”, in M. Kułakowska, P. Borowiec, P. Ścigaj (eds.), Oblicza kampanii wyborczych 2015, 
Kraków 2016, pp. 341-343. See also Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów w sprawie relokacji cudzoziemców 
w roku 2016 (draft), 12 January 2016.
102 Poselski projekt uchwały w sprawie polityki imigracyjnej Polski, parliamentary print no. 230, 8 February 
2016.
103 Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 1 kwietnia 2016 r. w sprawie polityki imigracyjnej Polski, 
M.P. 2016, poz. 370.
104 A. Adamczyk, “Współpraca państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej na forum Unii Europejskiej – doświadcze-
nia i wyzwania”, Studia Europejskie, no. 4 (2015), p. 85.
105 “Komorowski-Duda. Debata w TVP”, TVP Info, 17 May 2015, at <http://www.tvp.info/20097161/
zobacz-cala-debate-komorowskiduda>, 10 May 2015.
106 Polska Agencja Prasowa, “‘Do września kraje UE powinny relokować 26 tys. Uchodźców’”, PolskieRa-
dio.pl, 27 March 2017, at <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1744974,Do-wrzesnia-kraje-UE-
powinny-relokowac-26-tys-uchodzcow>, 1 April 2017; B. Cunningham, “5 Takeaways from Slovakia’s 
Election”, Politico, 6 March 2016, at <http://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-fico-asylum-migrants-
elections-nazi-nationalists/>, 10 May 2017; M. Kern, “Smer mení kampaň, ide chrániť Slovensko”, Den-
ník N, 18 October 2015, at <https://dennikn.sk/271525/smer-meni-kampan-ide-chranit-slovensko>, 
10 May 2017.
107 G. Mesežnikov, “Slovenský politický rok 2016 sa zrejme ešte nekončí”, SME, 29 December 2016, 
at <https://komentare.sme.sk/c/20419964/slovensky-politicky-rok-2016-sa-zrejme-este-nekonci.
html#axzz4gWwDUkpw>, 10 May 2017.
108 “Slovak PM Says Will Fight to Keep Immigration to a Minimum”, Reuters, 7 January 2016, at <http://
af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0UL1ZK20160107>, 10 May 2017.
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anti-immigration party led by radical Marian Kotleba, came fifth in the election (8%), 
for the first time gaining parliamentary seats.
4.2.  The migrant quota referendum in Hungary and the attempt to change the 
Hungarian constitution (2016)
In September 2016, Orbán undertook two initiatives. Firstly, he called for the quota 
referendum, which took place on October 2nd. The Hungarians were asked one straight-
forward question: Do you want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the man-
datory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the Na-
tional Assembly? The results were easy to predict: 98% of the Hungarians (3.36 million 
voters) answered negatively. Only 1.64% (56,163 voters) voted yes. The turnout, how-
ever, was only 44%109 and according to The Fundamental Law of Hungary, only deci-
sions taken on a valid and conclusive referendum shall be binding on the National Assem-
bly. A referendum is to be regarded as conclusive if more than half of those voting validly 
have given the same answer to a question, and as valid if more than half of all voters have 
cast valid votes.110 Therefore, the first condition was met, but the second was not.
A few days after the announcement of the results of the referendum, Orbán 
launched the second initiative putting forward a proposal to amend the constitution. 
Among a couple of changes, there was the crucial one introducing the law that would 
prohibit non-Hungarians (with the exception of the citizens of the countries of the Euro-
pean Economic Area) from living in Hungary. They would only be able to settle down 
in Hungary on the basis of individual requests which would be processed by the au-
thorities according to a specific procedure. The introduction of this law would block 
the possibility of receiving groups of migrants as each case would have to be dealt with 
separately. In the justification of the project, its authors expressly referred to the will of 
more than 3 million Hungarians who voted no in the referendum.111 A couple of weeks 
later, the Hungarian PM threatened to sue the EC if the mandatory quotas were to be 
109 National referendum. October 2, 2016, Website of the National Election Office, 11 October 2016, at 
<http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ref2016/481/481_0_index.html>, 1 March 2017; Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán Informs EC President of Referendum Result via Letter, Website of the Hungarian Government, 
6 October 2016, at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/prime-minister-viktor-
orban-informs-ec-president-of-referendum-result-via-letter>, 10 May 2017.
110 The Fundamental Law of Hungary (25 April 2011). Translation of the Consolidated Version of the Fun-
damental Law as on 1 October 2013, Website of the Hungarian Government, at <http://www.kormany.
hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf>, 10 May 
2017.
111 Magyarország Alaptörvényének hetedik módosítása, Website of the Hungarian National Assembly, 
10 October 2017, at <http://www.parlament.hu/irom40/12458/12458.pdf>, 10 May 2017; The 
Prime Minister Has Submitted to Parliament a Bill for a Constitutional Amendment, Website of the 
Hungarian Government, 10 October 2016, at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/
news/the-prime-minister-has-submitted-to-parliament-a-bill-for-a-constitutional-amendment>, 10 May 
2017.
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introduced once again.112 Amending the Hungarian constitution requires support of 
the two-thirds of the votes (133) in the National Assembly. In November 2016, the 
amendment was supported by only 131 parliamentarians and the fundamental law re-
mained unchanged.113
4.3. The Dublin plus and the Concept of Flexible (Effective) Solidarity
Facing massive resistance to the mandatory quotas while observing little progress on 
the relocation and resettlement, in May 2016 the EC presented its proposal of a com-
plex reform of the Common European Asylum System, which included amending the 
Dublin Regulation (the so called Dublin plus). It introduced the corrective allocation 
mechanism. It would be triggered automatically where the number of applications for in-
ternational protection for which a Member State is responsible exceeds 150% of the figure 
identified in the reference key. The key would be based on two criteria with equal 50% 
weighting, the size of the population and the total GDP of a Member State. States not will-
ing or able to participate in the corrective allocation would be required to make a soli-
darity contribution of EUR 250,000 per applicant to the Member States that were deter-
mined as responsible for examining those applications.114 Although the document did not 
present it this way, this amount was commonly commented as a ‘penalty’. Not surpris-
ingly, the reaction of the V4 was unequivocally negative.115 Both the ruling parties and 
the opposition expressed their objection.116
In September 2016, the V4 responded putting forward a concept called flexible soli-
darity which would enable Member States to decide on specific forms of contribution tak-
ing into account their experience and potential. Furthermore any distribution mechanism 
should be voluntary.117 Shortly after that Fico announced that the quotas which divide 
112 “Orbán beszélt az állami rádióban, és mintha kissé ingerült lenne”, Népszava, 28 October 2016, at 
<http://nepszava.hu/cikk/1110191-orban-beszelt-az-allami-radioban-es-mintha-kisse-ingerult-lenne>, 
10 May 2017.
113 About motives of Jobbik, Politics Can Be Different (Lehet Más a Politika, LMP ) and Hungarian So-
cialist Party, which did not support the amendment, see for example S. Dull, “Leszavazták Orbán Vik-
tor alkotmánymódosítását”, Index.hu, 8 November 2016, at <http://index.hu/belfold/2016/11/08/
szavazas_az_alkotmanymodositasrol>, 10 May 2017.
114 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council es-
tablishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or 
a stateless person (recast), Brussels, 4 May 2016, COM(2016) 270 final, 2016/0133 (COD), pp. 18-19.
115 Joint Declaration of the Visegrád Group Prime Ministers…
116 G. Mesežnikov, “Problematika migrácie a utečencov na Slovensku v rokoch 2015-2016: spoločenská 
atmosféra, verejná mienka, politickí aktéri”, in M. Hlinčíková, G. Mesežnikov (eds.), Otvorená krajina 
alebo nedobytná pevnosť? Slovensko, migranti a utečenci, Bratislava 2016, pp. 128, 131; “Kvóty na ute-
čencov spôsobili v Európe hotovú pohromu: Naši poslanci sa poriadne oduševnili!”, Pluska.sk, 6 May 
2016, at <http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/zjednoteni-hneve-kvoty-utecencov-sposobili-eur
ope-pohromu-nasi-poslanci-poriadne-odusevnili.html>, 10 May 2017.
117 Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries, The Visegrád Group, at <http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-of-the-160919>, 10 May 2017.
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the EU are, in his opinion, politically finished.118 Although initially greeted with en-
thusiasm by both Christian democrats and socialists,119 it quickly became criticized by 
some countries of Southern Europe which argued that the only plausible solution was 
an automatic relocation procedure triggered by the increased migration pressure.120 
Between July and December 2016, the presidency of the Council of the European 
Union was held by Slovakia. Bratislava wanted to seize the opportunity and push the 
idea of flexible solidarity at the EU summit scheduled on December 15th 2016. Thus, 
the concept was expanded, redesigned and renamed to effective solidarity. In mid-No-
vember, Slovakia presented a document entitled Effective Solidarity: A Way Forward on 
Dublin Revision. It introduced three different mechanisms dedicated to dealing with 
three stages of migration: normal, deteriorating, and severe circumstances. Under normal 
circumstances, the system would operate under the same rules. If deteriorating circum-
stances occurred, the member states would be required to relocate a well-defined propor-
tion of applicants or to help the state affected by the problem in a different way, from 
specific financial contributions to tailor-made wider contributions relevant for both the 
internal and external migration field (for example joint return operations, joint processing 
of applications, sharing reception facilities during the process of examining the applications 
and increased contributions to the European Border and Coast Guard and the Euro-
pean Asylum Support Office). In severe circumstances, the EC (note: not the Council) 
should decide on additional supportive measures, on a voluntary basis.121 A couple of days 
later, the V4 also established the Migration Crisis Response Mechanism (MCRM), 
aimed at creating new or enhancing existing links between the Participating States’ govern-
mental institutions responsible for migration. It was to be coordinated by Poland and open 
for all EU Member States willing to participate.122
While the Slovakian proposal gained the support of the rest of the V4,123 most of 
the other EU member states remained unconvinced. As expected, it was opposed by 
several states, particularly Italy, Greece and Germany. The December summit ended 
without a conclusion in this regard. The debate on the effective solidarity was to be 
118 E. Zalan, “EU Migrant Quota Idea Is Finished, Fico Says”, EUobserver, 27 September 2016, at <https://
euobserver.com/migration/135245>, 10 May 2017.
119 P. Malinowski, “Unia Europejska: Pomysł V4 ws. ‘elastycznej solidarności’ zyskuje poparcie”, Rzeczpo-
spolita, 25 September 2015, at <http://www.rp.pl/Unia-Europejska/160929526-Unia-Europejska-
Pomysl-V4-ws-elastycznej-solidarnosci-zyskuje-poparcie.html#ap-1>, 10 May 2017.
120 J. Szymańska,“Perspektywy kompromisu w sprawie reformy wspólnego europejskiego systemu azylo-
wego”, Biuletyn Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodowych, no. 12 (1454), 2 February 2017, p. 1.
121 Effective Solidarity: A Way Forward on Dublin Revision, pp. 1-2, Statewatch, at <http://statewatch.org/
news/2016/nov/eu-council-slovak-pres-non-paper-dublin-effective-solidarity-11-16.pdf>, 10 May 2017.
122 Joint Statement of V4 Interior Ministers on the Establishment of the Migration Crisis Response Mecha-
nism, In Warsaw, November 21, 2016, The Visegrád Group, 21 November 2016, at <http://www.
visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2016/joint-statement-of-v4>, 10 May 2017.
123 V4 to Set up a Common Crisis Management Centre, Website of the Hungarian Government, 22 Novem-
ber 2016, at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-interior/news/v4-to-set-up-a-common-crisis-
management-centre>, 10 May 2017.
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continued in the forthcoming months.124 Zsuzsanna Végh accurately pointed out that 
the approach of the V4 in replacing relocation with alternative measures is essentially not 
much different from the Commission’s proposal, as the effective solidarity would require to 
put a ‘price tag’ on individuals not relocated for the system to be in any way manageable.125 
If so, then what was the point of the proposal? Firstly, it could be seen as a tool of po-
litical marketing, an attempt to respond to the weakening image of the V4 in the EU.126 
Because the Group is often criticised for not articulating an alternative to the Commis-
sion’s proposals, which it often opposes,127 it may be perceived as just that. Secondly, the 
symbolic value of the Slovakian proposal should be taken into consideration. Bratislava 
and its supporters signalled that the solution to the migration problem should be for-
mulated bottom-up rather than be orchestrated by the EC. Thirdly, the emphasis put 
on the role of the European Council and not the Council in severe circumstances signals 
confidence that the key decisions concerning the relocation should be carried unani-
mously and not voted by a qualified majority like on September 22nd 2015.
4.4. Relocating and resettling migrants among the V4 states – the state of play
The V4 countries are not willing to meet their obligations to receive relocated mi-
grants. As of May 2017, they had accepted only 0.2% of the migrants within the reloca-
tion and 3.7% within the resettlement. The table below shows the number of migrants 
received by the V4 states under the relocation and resettlement programs.
124 “Szczyt UE: Porozumienie ws. migracji w pierwszej połowie 2017 roku”, RMF FM, 15 December 2016, 
at <http://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/swiat/news-szczyt-ue-porozumienie-ws-migracji-w-pierwszej-polowie-
2017-,nId,2322943>, 10 May 2017; M. Mikulska, “UE planuje na styczeń nowy szczyt z Turcją”, Rzecz-
pospolita, 16 December 2016, at <http://www.rp.pl/Unia-Europejska/161219397-UE-planuje-na-
styczen-nowy-szczyt-z-Turcja.html#ap-1>, 10 May 2017.
125 Z. Végh, “Flexible Solidarity, Intergovernmentalism and Differentiated Integration”, Visegrád Insight, 
no. 1 (2017), p. 30.
126 Ł. Ogrodnik, “Grupa Wyszehradzka z perspektywy Słowacji”, Biuletyn Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Mię-
dzynarodowych, no. 37 (1479), 11 April 2017, p. 2.
127 For example Anne Applebaum stated that the V4 became an initiative of one single case, and that the 
Group does not have a positive project for Europe. S. András, A. Applebaum, “Ezért nem állok szóba ma-
gyarokkal – Anne Applebaum a Mandinernek”, Mandiner, 18 April 2016, at <http://mandiner.hu/
cikk/20160417_ezert_nem_allok_szoba_magyarokkal_anne_applebaum_interju_mandiner>, 10 May 
2017.
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Table 5. The relocation and resettlement of migrants among the V4 states: the final numbers 
and the state of play as of September 6th 2017
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Poland 1100 5082 6182 6.3 900 4 7082 0 0
Czech Republic 1100 1591 2691 2.7 400 1.8 3091 0.4 13
Hungary 0 1294 1294 1.3 0 0 1294 0 n/a
Slovakia 100 802 902 0.9 100 0.4 1002 1.8 0
V4 2300 8769 11069 11.3 1400 6.2 12469 0.2 3.7
The author’s calculations are based on the following sources: Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation 
Mechanism (As of 3 May 2017), pp. 1-2, European Commission website, 10 May 2017, at <https://ec.europa.
eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/
docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf>, 10 May 2017; European Commission, Annex to the Report from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council “Eleventh report on re-
location and resettlement”, Brussels, 12 April 2017,COM(2017) 212 final, Annex 4, p. 2-3; Relocation and 
resettlement 6 September 2017, European Commission website, 6 September 2017, at <https://ec.europa.
eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20170904_
factsheet_relocation_and_resettlement_en.pdf>.
The V4 states were failing to fulfil their obligations, stalling for time, testing the 
Commission’s determination and waiting for both the CJEU’s verdict and the end of 
relocation schemes. In March 2017, Avramopoulos issued a warning concerning the 
member states’ obligations saying that there are no more excuses for the Member States 
not to deliver on resettling refugees.128 In April 2017, The Times wrote that the coun-
tries should expect to receive an ultimatum demanding that they accept their quota of 
128 European Commission – Speech – [Check Against Delivery]. Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos 
on the migration package adopted by the College ahead of the March European Council, European Union 
website, 2 March 2017, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-425_en.htm>, 10 May 
2017.
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migrants or get out of the EU.129 On May 16th, the 12th report on the relocation and 
resettlement was published. The Commission urged the Member States that have not 
relocated anyone, or have not pledged for Italy and Greece for almost a year, to start do-
ing so immediately and within a month. If no action is taken, the Commission will specify 
in its next report in June 2017 its position on making use of its powers under the Treaties 
and in particular on the opening of infringement procedures.130 On the same day, Szydło 
clearly stated: Currently there is no possibility for refugees to be received by Poland. We 
will not agree to imposing involuntary quotas concerning refugees in Poland or other mem-
ber states.131 In June 2017, the EC launched infringement procedures against the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland for non-compliance with their obligations under the 2015 
Council Decisions on relocation.132 A month later the EC decided to move to the second 
stage in infringement procedure, issuing reasoned opinions.133 Due to the continuing 
lack of willingness to comply on the part of the three states, at the time of closing this 
article it seemed certain that by the end of 2017 the EC will move to the third stage, 
thus referring the matter to the CJEU.
5.  INTERNAL FACTORS OF THE VISEGRÁD GROUP’S STANCE
TOWARDS THE MIGRANT CRISIS
The Group’s opposition to the migrant quotas results from their limited capabilities 
(wealth level, infrastructure, know-how) as well as historical and cultural conditions 
(lack of historical contacts with Islamic culture and rather negative experiences with na-
tional minorities). The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are not the mi-
gration target countries, which obviously affects their perspectives. Additionally, the 
location of Hungary on the main transit route of migrants has put this state in the most 
difficult situation.134 But it is not just a matter of political will and political configura-
129 B. Waterfield, “Take in Migrants or Leave, EU Tells Hungary and Poland”, The Times, 4 April 2017, 
at <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/take-in-migrants-or-leave-eu-tells-hungary-and-poland-
rscwfgtwn>, 10 May 2017.
130 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council “Twelfth report on relocation and resettlement”, Strasbourg, 16 May 2017, COM(2017) 
260 final, p. 11.
131 A. Bartkiewicz, “Beata Szydło: Polska nie przyjmie uchodźców”, Rzeczpospolita, 16 May 2017, at 
<http://www.rp.pl/Rzad-PiS/170519184-Beata-Szydlo-Polska-nie-przyjmie-uchodzcow.html#ap-1>, 
17 May 2017.
132 European Commission – Press release. Relocation: Commission launches infringement procedures against 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, European Union website, 14 June 2017, at <http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1607_en.htm>, 15 June 2017.
133 European Commission – Press release. Relocation: Commission moves to next stage in infringement pro-
cedures against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, European Union website, 26 July 2017, at 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2103_en.htm>.
134 D. Kałan, “Kryzys migracyjny jednoczy Wyszehrad”, Biuletyn Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodo-
wych, no. 769 (1316), 16 September 2015, pp. 1-2.
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tion, but also of strong social grounds for reluctance to the relocation and resettlement 
of migrants.
Basic intuition suggests that countries whose populations are (i) most concerned 
about migration, (ii) emphasise reluctance towards others and (iii) to the European 
integration, would be particularly prone to consistently resisting the development of 
compulsory solidarity mechanisms in the context of the migration crisis. The case of 
the V4 states shows that the issue is of a more complicated nature. It is easiest to exclude 
the last interpretation – the V4 countries have a positive attitude towards the Union. 
The percentage of positive stances of the four societies does not differ significantly or 
even exceeds (especially as regards the particularly enthusiastic Polish public) the per-
centage of positive stances of Western societies.135 Also when it comes to the threat of 
migration, similar suspicions do not find empirical confirmation. This is shown in the 
table below based on Eurobarometer data.
Figure 1. The percentage of Europeans who stated that immigration is one of 
 the two most important issues faced by their country
The table was developed by the author using the following sources: European Commission, Standard Euro-
barometer 84 – Autumn 2015. “Public opinion in the European Union, First results”, p. 17; European Com-
mission, Standard Eurobarometer 86 – Autumn 2016. “Public opinion in the European Union, First results”, 
p. 11. The research was conducted in November 2015 and November 2016.
135 See for example European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 84 – Autumn 2015. “Public opinion 
in the European Union, First results”, p. 17; European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 86 – Au-
tumn 2016. “Public opinion in the European Union, First results”, p. 11.
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Surprisingly, in the autumn of 2015 only Czechs were above the European average 
and were the only V4 nation which perceived migration as the most important issue. For 
the Hungarians, it was their second choice, for Slovaks – the third. Poles did not place 
it in the top three at all.136 A year later, the Hungarians were slightly above the European 
average, and migration was their second most important issue, just as Czechs’. Slovaks 
and Poles did not place it in the top three.137 Furthermore, it must be stressed that the 
V4 citizens did not recognise terrorism, a phenomenon which is often depicted as con-
nected with the migration crisis, as a major challenge for their countries. In 2015, out of 
all the EU nations only the British and the French placed it in the top three (the second 
and the third place respectively). In 2016, the French did it again (the second place in 
the hierarchy); it was also the opinion of the Germans (the second place) and Belgians 
(the second place).138
Thus, although it would be groundless to claim that the V4 nations are Eurosceptic, 
the fact is that their policies have strong social foundations, for example the widely dis-
cussed xenophobic attitudes.139 Fear of migrants, while not being an all-encompassing 
phenomenon, is common among the V4 nations.140 The table below shows the atti-
tude of Czechs and Poles towards receiving migrants according to public opinion polls 
conducted in 2015-2017. Unfortunately, the comparative study covering all of the V4 
nations has not yet been conducted. Only the studies done in the Czech Republic and 
Poland are characterised by adequate regularity and therefore suitable for comparison. 
Slovak and Hungarian polling organisations do not carry out this type of consequent 
research and only once in a while the results of singular polls are published by the me-
dia. Due to the different samplings, methods and questions, it is impossible to make 
a direct comparison.
136 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 84 – Autumn 2015…, p. 17.
137 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 86 – Autumn 2016…, p. 11.
138 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 84 – Autumn 2015…, p. 17; European Commission, 
Standard Eurobarometer 86 – Autumn 2016…, p. 11.
139 See for example A. Juhász, P. Krekó, Desperate Search for the Lost Popularity. Governmental Campaign 
against Refugees and Migrants in Hungary, Budapest, May 2015, p. 5.
140 About four different levels of fear among V4 nations, see B. Simonovits, “Migration-Related Fear and 
Scapegoating – Comparative Approach in the Visegrad Countries”, in idem, A. Bernát (eds.), The Social 
Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary, Budapest, March 2016, p. 34.
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Figure 2. The stance towards accepting refugees – the percentage of negative answers  
in the Czech Republic and Poland (May 2015–October 2017)
The questions asked by the interviewers of both polling organisations were the same: should [the Czech 
Republic/Poland] accept refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts?
The data was taken from the following sources: Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Tisková zpráva. 
Postoj české veřejnosti k přijímání uprchlíků – únor 2017, Prague, 27 March 2017, p. 2; Centrum Badania 
Opinii Społecznej, “Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchodźców”, Komunikat z badań, no. 1, January 
2017, p. 2; Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Postoj české veřejnosti k přijímání uprchlíků a kvótám 
na jejich přerozdělování – říjen 2017, Prague, 17 December 2017, p. 2-3.
The presented results are telling. In general, the analysis of all the public opinion 
polls in the V4 countries proves that their governments’ policies in the period covered 
by this article had a strong social foundation. When in June 2015 Slovaks were asked 
whether they were for Slovakia to receive refugees from the Middle East and North Af-
rica on the basis of quotas proposed by the European Union?, 70% of the respondents an-
swered negatively.141 At the beginning of 2016, Fico’s policies were supported by 89% 
of Slovaks.142
The reluctant attitude is also dominant in Hungary, as confirmed by the results 
of the quota referendum and the popularity of the largest parties. What draws atten-
tion is the Orbán rebound – after the construction of the border wall began, the down-
ward trend of Fidesz was halted and since then the support for the party has clearly 
141 “Prieskum: Slovensko by nemalo prijať utečencov, myslia si Slováci”, SME, 17 June 2015, at <https://
domov.sme.sk/c/7864014/prieskum-slovensko-by-nemalo-prijat-utecencov-myslia-si-slovaci.
html#ixzz4fkko6WJX>, 10 May 2017.
142 G. Mesežnikov, “Problematika migrácie a utečencov…”, p. 116. 
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increased.143 It is not surprising that when in 2015 a  journalist of Bild asked Orbán 
whether his role of the European main villain was bothering him, he replied: I can only 
say: I stand here and cannot act otherwise.144
The relocation procedure and the forced quotas became symbols of the EU’s policy 
on the migrant crisis as a whole. The leaders of the V4 governments as well as the op-
position in the four countries are aware of that.
In the Czech Republic, social opposition to fulfilling EU’s obligations concern-
ing the migrant crisis is very visible.145 Currently, the biggest party opposing Sobotka’s 
cabinet, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech 
a Moravy, KSČM), is against the reception of migrants.146 In April 2017, ODS added 
a new postulate to its programme – a refusal of mandatory quotas of refugees proposed by 
the EU.147 Earlier it appealed to the government to prepare for the possibility of closing 
the borders.148 TOP 09 is also against the quotas although this party is not opposed to 
accepting migrants and its demands in many places coincide with the EU’s proposals.149 
As Grigory Mesežnikov argued, all of the Slovak parties, except perhaps for Most-Híd, 
are negatively oriented as well. The opposition to the EU quotas is widespread.150
143 Z. Simon, “Hungarian Refugee Vote May Boost Orban’s Power in Divided EU”, Bloomberg, 30 Sep-
tember 2016, at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-29/hungarian-refugee-vote-
may-boost-orban-s-power-in-divided-europe>, 10 May 2017.
144 D. Varro, H.-J. Vehlewald, V. Orbán, “Darum baut Ungarn einen Zaun gegen Flüchtlinge”, Bild, 19 Sep-
tember 2015, at <http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/viktor-orban/darum-baut-ungarn-einen-zaun-
gegen-fluechtlinge-42544402.bild.html#fromWall>, 10 May 2017.
145 Ł. Ogrodnik, “Grupa Wyszehradzka w polityce Republiki Czeskiej”, Biuletyn Polskiego Instytutu Spraw 
Międzynarodowych, no. 91 (1441), 19 December 2016, p. 2.
146 See for example Ne! byrokratickému diktátu EU, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, 15 Janu-
ary 2015, at <http://old.kscm.cz/politika-kscm/stanoviska-kscm/98096/ne-byrokratickemu-diktatu-
eu>, 10 May 2017; “Nekl (KSČM): Sobotka chystá integraci uprchlíků, které přitom údajně ČR ne-
bude přijímat”, Parlamentní listy, 1 September 2016, at <http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/politika/
politici-volicum/Nekl-KSCM-Sobotka-chysta-integraci-uprchliku-ktere-pritom-udajne-CR-nebude-
prijimat-451509>, 10 May 2017.
147 ODS 2017. Silný program pro silné Česko, Civic Democratic Party, 22 April 2017, at <http://www.ods.
cz/volby2017/program/bezpecnost>, 10 May 2017.
148 “ODS chce, aby se vláda připravila na možné uzavření hranic”, Novinky.cz, 28 April 2016, at <https://
www.novinky.cz/domaci/401869-ods-chce-aby-se-vlada-pripravila-na-mozne-uzavreni-hranic.html>, 
10 May 2017.
149 “EP Is for Quotas on Refugees, Czech Politicians Can’t Agree”, Romea.cz, 7 May 2015, at <http://www.
romea.cz/en/news/world/ep-is-for-quotas-on-refugees-czech-politicans-can-t-agree>, 10 May 2017. See 
“TOP 09 Rejects Zeman, Klaus’s Anti-migration Rhetoric”, Prague Daily Monitor, 10 September 2015, 
at <http://praguemonitor.com/2015/09/10/top-09-rejects-zeman-klauss-anti-migration-rhetoric>, 
1 March 2017; Klíčová opatření k řešení migrační krize podle TOP 09, TOP 09, at <http://www.top09.
cz/proc-nas-volit/politika/migracni-politika>, 10 May 2017.
150 G. Mesežnikov, “Problematika migrácie a utečencov…”, p. 146.
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In Hungary, Orbán’s Fidesz is competing with the far-right Jobbik.151 Although 
some scholars label it as a  semi-opposition,152 the rivalry between those two parties 
has deep foundations. The coalition between them is unlikely as it would most likely 
end in Jobbik’s split and marginalisation. Although the electorate of the Hungarian 
Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP), the left-wing opposition, is clearly 
less reluctant to accept migrants than the Fidesz or Jobbik voters,153 the party has little 
chance of gaining power in the next election. In fact, this note applies to the opposition 
as a whole. Nevertheless, it attempts to use the migrant crisis to promote its ideas.154 
There are many indications that in 2018 the radical Jobbik, a party even less willing to 
accept migrants then the ruling Fidesz, will be Orbán’s most dangerous competitor.155 
Warsaw emphasises that attempts to impose migrant quotas are unfair since there are 
already many immigrants from Ukraine in Poland. The Hungarians are acting similarly 
stressing that gaps in the European labour market could be fulfilled by training and in-
tegrating the six to eight million Roma already living in Europe.156
In Poland, PiS is the guarantor of consistent opposition to the compulsory quotas. 
The coalition of PO and PSL and the government of Kopacz were aware of social ex-
pectations and were trying to balance between them and the mainstream of European 
politics. In September 2015, at the last moment, the government changed its mind 
succumbing to the pressure of the largest EU states, especially Germany, while trying 
to distinguish itself from PiS before the forthcoming parliamentary elections. For a de-
cade, Jarosław Kaczynski’s party had been governed by the logic of ‘guarding the right 
wall’, i.e. blocking every potential rival on the right side of the political scene. That is 
precisely why PiS utilises radical (often anti-European) emotions by absorbing compet-
151 “Viktor Orbán’s Answer to the Jobbik Campaign against Him and His Regime”, Blog Hungarian Spec-
trum, 2 May 2017, at <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/05/02/viktor-orbans-answer-to-the-jobbik-
campaign-against-him-and-his-regime/>, 10 May 2017; “Medián: Serious Loss for Fidesz, Gain for 
Jobbik”, Blog Hungarian Spectrum, 3 May 2017, at <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/05/03/
median-serious-loss-for-fidesz-gain-for-jobbik/>, 10 May 2017; K. Szombati, “Why Hungarian Voters 
Are Turning Away from Fidesz and towards Jobbik”, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2 June 2015, at <https://
www.boell.de/en/2015/06/02/why-hungarian-voters-are-turning-away-fidesz-and-towards-jobbik>, 
10 May 2017.
152 Z. Ádám, A. Bozóki, “State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary”, 
Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics, vol. 2, no. 1 (2016), p. 115, at <http://dx.doi.
org/10.17356/ieejsp.v2i1.143>.
153 A. Bernát et al., Attitudes towards Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants. First Results (October 2015), 
Budapest, November 2015, pp. 18-19.
154 See for example T. Lengyel, “Menekülteket fogadott be Gyurcsány Ferenc”, Origo.hu, 2 September 2015, 
at <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20150902-gyurcsany-ferenc-menekultek-szirek-afganok.html>, 10 
May 2017.
155 See for example M. Dunai, “Hungary’s Jobbik Ditches Far-right Past to Challenge Orban in 2018”, Reu-
ters, 11 January 2017, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-jobbik-idUSKBN14V1PW>, 
10 May 2017.
156 Humanitarian Refugees Should Be Allowed into Europe, but Not Economic Refugees, Website of the Hun-
garian Government, 5 July 2015, at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-human-resources/news/
humanitarian-refugees-should-be-allowed-into-europe-but-not-economic-refugees>, 10 May 2017.
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ing groups or by not allowing them to be formed. As long as PiS is the ruling party, Po-
land will not make any concessions in this regard.
The PiS administration would probably be willing to accept a small number of ref-
ugees provided that the number would be negotiated, not imposed, and that the op-
eration would be carried out without media hype. The problem is that the EU is not 
interested in such a scenario. Western Europeans expect not only compliance and col-
laboration, but above all loud and clear messages. The symbol of quotas was a  bigger 
matter than a  real solution to the problem in Europe, argued the Slovakian PM.157 It 
should be noted that making concessions by the Szydło cabinet would probably result 
in an increased popularity of such radical groups as the National Movement (currently 
a non-parliamentarian party). The results of public opinion polls are unequivocal. The 
percentage of Poles who believe that Poland should not accept refugees from countries 
suffering from armed conflict increased from 21% in May 2015 to 52% in December 
2016. For more than a year, the number of the Poles reluctant to receiving migrants has 
been considerably higher than the number of the supporters of the opposite view.158 
Among the V4 nations, Poles are less reluctant towards accepting migrants and they 
are characterised by a lower level of fear of them.159 But even in Poland, the opposition 
to immigration dominates. It is primarily an attribute of the voters of PiS (79% express 
the negative stance), but the voters of PO, main opposition party, are not very far be-
hind (50%).160 In the spring of 2017, PO announced that it would not accept the mi-
grants.161 Currently, Szydło’s government is trying to combat the image of being reluc-
tant towards helping refugees by strongly promoting on-site help policy.
CONCLUSION
It is not by mere coincidence that on 15 February 2016, on the 25th anniversary of the 
establishment of the V4, the Group published two separate join statements: while the 
first concentrated on celebrating the anniversary, the second was devoted to the mi-
gration crisis. Although its unanimity was limited to the migration issue, the Visegrád 
Group has experienced the second revival in the years 2015-2017. It is true that it has 
earned it more coverage than ever before in the 25 years of its existence.162 However, this 
is certainly not coverage welcomed from the marketing point of view. Anna Potyrała 
157 R. Muller, J. Lopatka, “Slovakia Will Challenge…”.
158 Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, “Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania…”, p. 2.
159 B. Simonovits, B. Szeitl, “Menekültekkel és migrációs politikával kapcsolatos attitűdök Magyarországon 
és nemzetközi összehasonlításban”, Társadalmi Riport (2016), p. 438.
160 Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, “Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania…”, p. 10.
161 “Schetyna potwierdza: Nie będziemy przyjmować nielegalnych migrantów”, Newsweek, 10 May 
2017, at <http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/schetyna-nie-bedziemy-przyjmowac-migrantow-po-o-
uchodzcach,artykuly,409922,1.html>, 10 May 2017.
162 M. Nič, “The Visegrád Group in the EU: 2016 as a Turning-point?”, European View, vol. 15, no. 2 
(2016), p. 282, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12290-016-0422-6>.
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has called the Group an unwilling coalition.163 The differences in opinions among the 
EU states, with the prominent role of the V4, are even considered to be an East-West 
fracture164 or a new iron curtain.165 In 2015, Tusk argued: I apologize for the simplifica-
tion, but one can argue about the division between East and West of the EU.166 A young 
Slovak journalist of SME wrote: Migration crisis was another chance to show constructive 
solutions from Visegrád. Instead, we brought up criticism, negativism and hatred.167 This 
is a representative example of a journalistic oversimplification concerning the V4 posi-
tion towards the migrant crisis. Firstly, it should be noted that the fundamental differ-
ences between the V4 and the rest of the EU concentrate on the relocation procedure. 
In many areas of the EU migration policy, the Group supports the stance of the EC. 
Not only does the V4 not prevent the EU from acting, but it advocates more exten-
sive reforms. Secondly, the moral values, so frequently raised by journalists, cannot be 
implemented in total isolation from two factors: internal conditions and the current 
shape of the EU.
The position of the Group concerning the migrant crisis in 2015-2017 remained 
transparent and consisted of the following stances:
 – Collaborating with the United Nations, the League of Arab States and the African
Union.
 – Distinguishing between refugees and economic migrants.
 – Ensuring effective control and protection of the EU external borders in all aspects is
needed.168
163 A. Potyrała, “Środkowoeuropejska koalicja niechętnych…”, p. 26; eadem, “W poszukiwaniu solidarno-
ści…”, p. 41.
164 F. Pastore, “The Next Big European Project? The Migration and Asylum Crisis: A Vital Challenge for 
the EU”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Policy Brief, no. 25 (2015), p. 2.
165 Sylvie Kauffmann from Le Monde wrote in August 2015: Twenty-six years ago Hungary opened the doors 
of the free world to thousands of East German refugees who sought to reach the West. Today, the country 
fortifies its border with Serbia to block the passage of refugees and migrants of the 21st century – S. Kauf-
fmann, “Le nouveau rideau de fer”, Le Monde, 29 August 2015, at <http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/
article/2015/08/29/le-nouveau-rideau-de-fer_4740031_3232.html>, 10 May 2017. See also J. Kuisz, 
“The New Iron Curtain? The V4 and the Refugee Crisis as Seen from the Polish Perspective”, in P. Mo-
rillas (ed.), Illiberal Democracies in the EU. The Visegrád Group and the Risk of Disintegration, Barcelona 
2017.
166 A. Widzyk, “Donald Tusk: Kryzys migracyjny dzieli Unię na Wschód i Zachód”, Interia.pl, 3 September 
2015, at <http://fakty.interia.pl/swiat/news-donald-tusk-kryzys-migracyjny-dzieli-unie-na-wschod-i-
zachod,nId,1879061>, 10 May 2017.
167 L. Onderčanin, “How Central Europe Can Reclaim its Good Image”, Visegrád Plus, 8 December 2016, 
at <http://visegradplus.org/how-central-europe-can-reclaim-its-good-image/>, 10 May 2017.
168 The V4 agreed with Tusk who stressed that either the EU will have strong external boarders, or it will be 
force to bring back internal ones. See for example I. Traynor, “Europe Split over Refugee Deal as Germa-
ny Leads Breakaway Coalition”, The Guardian, 30 November 2015, at <https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/nov/29/germanys-plan-to-strike-eu-wide-refugee-sharing-deal-stalls>, 10 V 2017; A. Grusz-
czak, “Ciemne chmury nad Schengen”, Analizy Zakładu Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, no. 2, 28 January 
2016, at <http://www.zbn.inp.uj.edu.pl/analizy?p_p_id=56_INSTANCE_s74udNM3g0ln&p_p_
lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&gr
oupId=92718966&articleId=113465806>, 10 May 2017.
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 – Fighting against traffickers and smugglers at the national level as well as further inten-
sification of police and intelligence cooperation.
 – Fighting with the Islamic State.
 – Intensification of diplomatic activities in regard to destabilized countries which
contribute to the migrant crisis.
 – Limitation of relocation directions – not all migrants should be relocated or re-
settled; a list of safe countries of origin is needed.
 – Making the return policy more effective.
 – Mobilizing Greece and Italy to build a hotspot system (swift implementation of func-
tional hotspots).
 – Pointing out the problem of migration from the east and south of Europe; calling
for the development of a more systemic and geographically comprehensive approach to 
migration and criticizing the EU’s focus on the Mediterranean region.
 – Providing humanitarian aid in the crisis-stricken countries of Europe and the Mid-
dle East.
 – Supporting the EU actions, but solely on the basis of voluntary consensus. Deci-
sions should be made unanimously at the level of heads of government.
 – Strengthening the European Asylum Support Office and the European Border and
Coast Guard Agency
 – Taking wider actions – the European Union attaches too much importance to the
relocation and resettlement; the main focus is being put on treating the effects of
disease and not its root causes.169
It remains a question whether the Group’s cohesion in the field of migration will
last. Though every once in a while the media argue that the V4 has died, so far these 
opinions have proved to be greatly exaggerated. In 2012, the editor-in-chief of the 
Visegrád Insight wondered if the V4 was dead or alive.170 In autumn of 2014 – just at 
the threshold of the Group’s revival – one of the Polish publicists argued that the Viseg-
rád Group practically does not exist. We should accept its death, he said, and think about 
Visegrád 2.0 consisting of the V4 members alongside the Baltic States, Romania and 
the Balkan countries.171 Three years later these plans seem distant. The migration cri-
sis breathed new life into the group and gave it a new outlook. Milan Nič argued that 
in the history of the Group and its influence within the EU, the year 2016 will be seen 
169 Joint Statement of the Heads of Government of the Visegrád Group Countries, Bratislava, 19 June 2015, The 
Visegrád Group, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-statement-of-the>, 10 May 
2017; Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the Visegrád Group Countries, Prague…; Joint 
Communiqué of the Visegrád Group Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 11 September 2015, The Vise-
grád Group, at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-communique-of-the-150911>, 
10 May 2017; Joint Statement of the Visegrád Group countries on the current migration situation…; Joint 
Statement on Migration, Prague, 15 February 2016, The Visegrád Group, at <www.visegradgroup.eu/
calendar/2016/joint-statement-on>, 10 May 2017.
170 W. Przybylski, “V4 Dead or Alive”, Visegrád Insight, vol. 1, no. 1 (2012), p. 3.
171 “Grupa Wyszehradzka to fikcja?”, Niezależna.pl, 31 October 2014, at <http://niezalezna.pl/60968-
grupa-wyszehradzka-fikcja>, 10 May 2017.
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as a  turning point.172 In order for the words of the Slovakian analyst to be true, the 
strengthening of the V4’s consistency would have to turn out to be long-lasting, while 
exceeding the confines of the migrant crisis. The end of a closer cooperation in the field 
of migration could be caused by a significant easing of the migration problem173 and/or 
by a drastic change of public views, but, as of October 2017, these are not the scenarios 
that are likely to occur in the near future. However, the cohesion of the Group will re-
main limited due to conflicting interests of its members in many vital areas.174 Thus, 
the crucial query is whether the intensification of cooperation in this field will translate 
into its strengthening in other areas, and, if so, which ones?
The Group’s position fits in with the ‘step back’ trend concerning European inte-
gration observable in recent years.175 The V4 certainly will not become, as some right-
wing publicists may imagine, an alternative to the EU or the root of the 21st century 
version of the intermarium. But the example of the European migrant crisis shows that 
the Group can be influential within the EU. The nearest challenge for its durability will 
be the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic scheduled for October 2017.176 
ANO, the coalition partner and the main concurrent of Sobotka’s ČSSD, has been 
leading the polls for months.177 Overall, today’s chances for Sobotka to retain office af-
ter 2017 seem slim. But even though it is possible that the next Slovakian government 
will be led by Babiš, it will probably not drastically change Prague’s stance towards the 
immigration crisis as the views of ANO’s leader, a populist and billionaire, are plain and 
simple: Czechs must do everything to reject migrants. The quotas are unacceptable and 
172 M. Nič, “The Visegrád Group in the EU…”, p. 282.
173 See for example D. Cianciara, “Kryzys związany z uchodźcami nie jest chwilowy”, Hygeia Public Health, 
vol. 50, no. 3 (2015), pp. 427-434.
174 See for example H. Foy, A. Byrne, “Splits over EU Test Relations between Visegrád Four”, Financial 
Times, 6 October 2016, at <https://www.ft.com/content/f5d017f8-84b2-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5>, 
10 May 2017.
175 Eszter Zalan stated at the end of 2016 that Visegrád, the name of a quiet medieval town in Hungary 
has in recent times become synonymous with the word ‘rebellion’ in Brussels. E. Zalan, “The Rise and 
Shine of Visegrád”, p. 14, EUobserver, 30 December 2016, at <https://euobserver.com/europe-in-
review/136044>.
176 On May 2nd 2017, the PM unexpectedly announced that in connection with the long-running contro-
versies concerning First Deputy PM and Minister of Finance Andrej Babiš, the founder and leader of 
ANO, ČSSD’s coalition partner, and his unwillingness to leave office, he is going to hand in the govern-
ment’s resignation. The snap election was briefly considered as one of the possible solutions. A couple 
of days later, the PM changed his mind and so the election will come about normally. R. Muller, “Czech 
Parties Look To Avoid Snap Election after PM Quits”, Reuters, 3 May 2017, at <http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-czech-government-idUSKBN17Z17N>, 10 May 2017; P. Kosová, V. Dolejší, “Sobot-
ka: Babiš by měl sám rezignovat. Babiš: Není důvod, na rozdíl od premiéra jsem úspěšný”, Seznam.cz, 
1 May 2017, at <https://www.seznam.cz/zpravy/clanek/premier-sobotka-babis-by-se-mel-zachovat-
jako-chlap-a-rezignovat-30812>, 10 May 2017.
177 Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění, Tisková zpráva. Stranické preference a volební model v dubnu 
2017, Prague, 24 April 2017, pp. 2-3.
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the government must oppose them even at the cost of sanctions.178 Since it is expected 
that the Hungarian parliamentary election of spring 2018 will be won by Fidesz, one 
could argue that a serious test of the Group’s consistency will not take place until the 
autumn of 2019 when the next parliamentary elections will be held in Poland. How-
ever, it must be remembered that in the meantime, in 2018, a discussion on the matter 
of the Common European Asylum System reform and a new Multiannual Financial 
Framework will take place. It is negotiations concerning those issues that will be a true 
test of the Group’s cohesion, determining if it will continue to experience its (limited) 
second revival.
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